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RELEVANT STATUTES AND ORDINANCES,
Section 10-7-26(2) of the Utah Code states, in part:
Nothing contained in this section or in the sections referred to in Subsection
(1) shall be construed to exempt any railway company from keeping every
portion of every street and alley used by it and upon or across which tracks
shall be constructed at or near the grade of such streets in good an safe
condition for public travel, but it shall keep the same planked, paved,
macadamized or otherwise in such condition for public travel as the
governing body of the city or town may from time to time direct, keeping the
plank, pavement or other surface of the street or alley level with the top of
the rails of the track.
"Railway company/5 for purposes of this section, is defined as "any company
which owns or operates railway tracks on, along or across a street or alley in any
city or town." Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-26(1).
Section 10-7-29 of the Utah Code states, in part:
The tracks of all railway companies when located upon the streets or
avenues of a city or town shall be kept in repair and safe in all respects for
the use of the traveling public, and such companies shall be liable for all
damages resulting by reason of neglect to keep such tracks in r e p a i r . . . . For
injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of any such company
to keep its tracks in proper repair . . . such company shall be liable and the
city or town shall be exempt from liability.
"Railway company," for purposes of this section, is defined as "any persons, companies,
corporations or associations owning or operating any street or other railway in any city or
town." Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-29.
Section 56-1 -11 of the Utah Code states:
Every railroad company shall be liable for damages caused by neglect to
make and maintain good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of
travel crosses its road.

1

Salt Lake City Code section 14.44.030 requires "railway companies" to keep portions of
streets "across which their tracks . . . are constructed and maintained in good and safe
condition for public travel."
Complete copies of each of the foregoing are included in the Addendum as Exhibit
A.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc. ( "SLCS") appeals from a final
order entered by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
granting summary judgment in favor of Utah Transit Authority ( "UTA") and dismissing,
with prejudice, SLCS's counterclaims against UTA. The trial court's order was appealed
to the Utah Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to this Court. This Court has
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly interpret the Administration and Coordination

Agreement between UTA and SLCS in concluding that SLCS assumed sole responsibility
for the maintenance, repair, and renewal of the railway trackage at issue?
2.

Did the trial court correctly interpret the Administration and Coordination

Agreement in concluding that SLCS is obligated to indemnify UTA for expenses UTA
incurred in defending claims brought against it for alleged failure to maintain properly the
railway trackage at issue?

2

3.

Did the trial court correctly dismiss SLCS's counterclaim for

indemnification from UTA?
These issued were preserved in the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.
[R.156-737, 741-920, 923-949, 962-96]. Each is reviewed for correctness. Taylor v.
Johnson, 1999 UT 35, f 6, 977 P.2d 479, 480; Circle Airfreight v. Boyce Equipment, 745
P.2d 828, 829 (Ut.Ct.App. 1987).
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This case involves the enforcement of SLCS's indemnification obligations as set
forth in the March 31, 1993, Administration and Coordination Agreement ( "Coordination
Agreement") between UTA and SLCS. The Coordination Agreement delineates the
respective rights and obligations of UTA and SLCS with respect the use of and operation
along a section of railroad owned by UTA ("Right of Way" or "trackage"). SLCS's
obligation to indemnify UTA, as set forth in the Coordination Agreement, was triggered
when Edward George Goebel and Kathy Goebel commenced an action against UTA and
SLCS on January 7, 1999, alleging that Mr. Goebel sustained injuries as a result of a
bicycling accident at a railroad crossing on tl ic Right of \A a.) , Specificall) ., the Goebels
claimed that the accident occurred because the crossing surface was not properly
maintained for the safety of the traveling public.
The Coordination Agreement allocates maintenance responsibilities between
SLCS and UTA for the R ight -of-Way. Those maintenance respoi isibilities correspond
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with use - the party using the trackage is required to maintain it. At the time of the
accident, SLCS was the sole operator on the relevant portion of the Right-of-Way. As the
sole operator, SLCS assumed responsibility for maintenance. SLCS likewise assumed the
risk of loss and agreed to indemnify UTA for any loss or damage arising in connection
with the performance of, or failure to perform, its maintenance obligations. Because the
Goebel's sued UTA for failing properly to maintain and repair the surface of the crossing,
SLCS is obligated to indemnify UTA for the costs incurred in defending and settling the
Goebel suit.
SLCS refused to indemnify and defend UTA. Instead, UTA was required to
defend itself against the Goebel's claims, ultimately incurring $163,190.69 in attorneys'
fees and costs. Shortly before trial, the Goebels settled with UTA for $75,000. SLCS
opted not to settle with the Goebels. While eventually obtaining a directed verdict in its
favor, SLCS paid more than $500,000 to defend against the Goebels' claims.
Following the disposition of the Goebel suit, UTA brought this action seeking
indemnification from SLCS for the cost of settlement as well as its attorneys' fees and
costs. In response, SLCS filed a counterclaim seeking indemnification from UTA based
on a proposed alternative interpretation of the Coordination Agreement.
B.

Disposition at the Trial Court.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary
judgment to UTA. A copy of the trial court's Ruling and Order, and the subsequent
Judgment, are included in the Addendum as Exhibits B and C respectively. The court
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ruled that, under the clear terms of the Coordination Agreement, SLCS was obligated to
maintain and repair the crossing at the time in question and therefore was required to
indemnify UTA for any and all loss or damage incurred in defending the Goebel suit. [R.
970-71]. The court explained that the clear intent of the parties, as revealed both by the
language of the Coordination Agreement and by the parties' course of conduct, was "that
the entity in control of a particular aspect of trackage was to be the entity responsible for
maintaining it." [R. 971]. At the time in question, SLCS was in control of the trackage at
issue, and UTA was not, and had not been, using any part of that trackage. The court
further ruled that the allocation of maintenance obligations was absolute and that UTA
had not reserved any maintenance duties with respect to the trackage for the period at
issue. [R. 967-69].
Further, the court explained that "UTA's loss resulted from the maintenance,
construction, operations or other acts or omissions of [SLCS], because the section of the
track where the accident occurred was within [SLCS's] control at the time . .. ."
Therefore, "the Coordination Agreement requires that [SLCS] indemnify UTA for its
payment of that obligation." [R. 971]. The agreement requires indemnification
regardless of any actual negligence on the part of the responsible party [ R 9 71]
The trial court rejected SLCSR's argument that it was only obligated to maintain
the Joint Trackage to the standards it deemed necessary for freight operations. Rather,
Secion 3.3 of the Coordination Agreement specifically required that SLCSR perform the
maintenance of the Joint Trackage in a good and workman like manner and in compliance
5

with all applicable laws and regulations. [R. 966]. The trial court also rejected SLCSR's
argument that UTA retained the primary duty of maintenance for the Joint Trackage:
Granted [SLCS] had limited use in terms of time and days, and UTA
retained ownership as well as substantial control in other ways, but the
burden of maintenance fell upon the party using the tracks under the
agreement and according to the intent of the parties.
[R. 967]. UTA did "did not make itself of guarantor of [SLCS's] exercise of
discretion in the manner of maintenance or repair of the joint trackage" for the
period of time in question. [R. 968].
The trial court held that the Coordination Agreement clearly provides that
the party responsible for the maintenance also assumes the risk, or liability,
associated with the performance of these obligations. When reading Sections 3.3
and 7.2 of the Coordination Agreement in conjunction with the course of conduct
of the parties, it is clear that SLCS is obligated to indemnify UTA for all loss and
damages sustained by UTA in defending the Goebel suit. [R. 970-71]. SLCS is
obligated to indemnify UTA regardless of any duties UTA may owe under the law
and regardless of any negligence on the part of UTA. [R. 971].
STATEMENT OF FACTS
SLCS's statement of facts is incomplete. The following sets forth the relevant,
undisputed background facts, the history of the ownership of and operation on the Rightof-Way, and the rulings by the trial court and the Utah Supreme Court in the underlying
case.
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A.

Execution of the Coordination Agreement.

On October 30, 1992, UTA and Union Pacific Railroad Company entered into a
Purchase and Sale Agreement ("PSA") whereby UTA acquired from Union Pacific a
23.55 mile railroad Right-of-Way that stretched from approximately 900 South in Salt
Lake City South to the Utah County line. UTA acquired the Right-of-Way for its
anticipated light rail project. [R. 228].
UTA acquired the Right-of-Way subject to a "Retained Freight Operating
Easement," which was intended to permit the easement-holder to operate regular freight
service along the Right-of-Way. [R. 229]. A copy of the Retained Freight Operating
Easement is included in the Addendum as Exhibit D. In a separate transaction with
Union Pacific, SLCS assumed and acquired the rights to all of Union Pacific's retained
interests, freight interests, and all other rights to the trackage that are considered
necessary for freight rail service. [R. 229].
SLCS's purchase of the Retained Freight Operating Easement enabled SLCS to
operate freight service on the Right-of-Way and to service approximately 30 freight
customers along the route. According to SLCS, the Retained Freight Operating Easement
gave SLCS exclusive use of the Right-of-Way until UTA eventually commenced
passenger service in late 1999. [R. 229].
Because UTA and SLCS both held certain interests in the Right-of-Way, the
parties entered into Coordination Agreement "to clarify and establish the parties'
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respective rights and obligations" with regard to the Right-of-Way. [R. 229]. A copy of
the Coordination Agreement is included in the Addendum as Exhibit E.
The Coordination Agreement divides the Right-of-Way into three separate track
designations: Freight Trackage, Passenger Trackage, and Joint Trackage. (See
Coordination Agreement §§3,5). Freight Trackage was to be used solely by SLCS to
conduct freight rail service. (Id. § 5.2). Passenger Trackage was to be used solely by
UTA to conduct passenger service, once it completed the light rail construction project.
(Id. §5.1). Joint Trackage eventually was to be used jointly by UTA and SLCS (id. §
5.3), but was to be used exclusively by SLCS until UTA commenced passenger service in
1999. The crossing at 1700 South, where the Goebel accident occurred, consisted entirely
of Joint Trackage. [R. 230].
B.

Assignment of Maintenance Obligations Under the Agreement.

The Coordination Agreement assigns the responsibility for the maintenance, repair,
and renewal of the Right-of-Way, including the track, grade crossings, and signal
facilities. Not surprisingly, the responsibility for the maintenance, repair, and renewal of
the trackage directly coincides with its use; namely, the party using the track assumed sole
responsibility for the maintenance of that track. Thus, UTA was solely responsible for
maintenance of the Passenger Trackage (Coordination Agreement § 3.2) and SLCS was
solely responsible for maintenance of the Freight Trackage (Id. § 3.1).
With respect to Joint Trackage, SLCS intended to provide freight rail service on
the Joint Trackage immediately, but UTA would not commence passenger service on the
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Joint Trackage until several years later. The Coordination Agreement therefore provides
that SLCS initially would be solely responsible for all maintenance, repair, and renewal of
the Joint Trackage. According to Section 3.3 of the Coordination Agreement:
SLS shall be responsible for the maintenance, repair and renewal of the
Joint Trackage and shall maintain, repair and renew the same to the
standards it deems necessary for Freight Rail Service; provided that SLS
shall, at a minimum, maintain, repair and renew the Joint Trackage so as to
preserve the present condition of the track, grade crossings and signal
facilities, as described in Exhibit "B" hereto. Nothing herein shall relieve
SLS of the obligation to perform maintenance, repair and renewal on the
Joint Trackage in a good and workman-like manner and in compliance with
all applicable laws and regulations.
(Id. § 3.3).1 When UTA commenced passenger service, and both parties were using the
Joint Trackage, responsibility for maintenance shifted to UTA:
Upon written notice to SLS at any time, but at least sixty (60) days prior to
commencement of Passenger Service, UTA shall undertake and assume all
costs of maintenance, repair and renewal of the Joint Trackage.
(Id. § 3.4). Thus, until UTA commenced passenger service (or gave SLCS written notice
of its intent to do so), SLCS was solely responsible for the maintenance, repair, and
renewal of the Joint Trackage.
C.

Indemnification Obligations Under the Coordination Agreement.

The Coordination Agreement also allocates risk and liability. Specifically, the
agreement provides that the party responsible, under the agreement, for the maintenance,

1

SLCS's maintenance obligations are also set forth in the Memorandum of Agreements
and Understandings (the "Memorandum"), executed on December 17, 1997. The
Memorandum required, among other things, that SLCS conduct weekly inspections of the
main portion of the Right-of-Way, including the crossing in question. [R. 233].
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repair, and renewal of the trackage, also assumed all liability for any loss or damage
resulting from or arising in connection with such duties. Section 7.2 of the Coordination
Agreement provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding (i) anything else contained in this Coordination
Agreement or (ii) other applicable law regarding allocation of liability
based on fault or otherwise, as between the parties hereto liability for Loss
or Damage resulting from or arising in connection with the maintenance
construction, operation or other acts or omissions of either party shall be
borne and paid by the parties as follows:
(a)

When such Loss or Damage results from or arises in connection with the
maintenance, construction, operations or other acts or omissions of only
one of the parties, regardless of any third party involvement, such Loss
or Damage shall be borne by that party

Section 7.3 further provides that:
Each party agrees that it will pay for all Loss or Damage the risk of which it
has herein assumed, the judgment of any court to the contrary and otherwise
applicable law regarding liability notwithstanding, and will forever
indemnify, protect, defend and hold harmless the other party, its successors
and assigns, from such payment.
It is undisputed that at the time of the Goebel accident, UTA had not yet
commenced passenger service on the Right-of-Way, nor had UTA given written notice
that it intended to assume maintenance responsibilities along the Joint Trackage. [R. 23132]. The Goebel accident occurred on February 19, 1998. [R. 231-32]. Passenger
service along the Right-of-Way did not commence until December 1999. [R. 232]. In an
Amended Administration and Coordination Agreement, executed on October 18, 1999,
the parties agreed that the transfer of maintenance obligations would occur on December
4, 1999. [R. 232].
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Thus, up to the time of the Goebel accident in February 1998, and from that time
through December 4, 1999, SLCS was solely responsible for maintaining, repairing, and
renewing the Joint Trackage, including the track, grade crossings, and signal facilities.
D,

SLCS's Conduct Prior to the Goebel Accident

From 1993 until 1999, SLCS assumed sole responsibility for the inspection and
maintenance of the track, grade crossings and signal facilities in accordance with the
terms of the Coordination Agreement. SLCS not only conducted regular inspections and
maintenance along the Joint Trackage, SLCS assumed responsibility for damages as a
result of certain defective conditions along the Right-of-Way. [R. 233-37.] At no time
did SLCS object to or question its obligations under the Coordination Agreement to
inspect, maintain, repair, and renew the track, grade crossings, and signal facilities. [R.
233-37].
1.

SLCS Inspected and Maintained the Joint Trackage.

To comply with its maintenance obligations under the Coordination Agreement,
SLCS hired a track inspector to inspect and maintain the trackage. SLCS hired John
Martinez as its track inspector in January 1998. [R. 234]. SLCS's CEO testified that Mr.

2

UTA rebuilt many of the crossings on the Right-of-Way as part of its light rail
construction process. As construction commenced on individual crossings, UTA
voluntarily assumed responsibility, on a case-by-case basis, for those individual crossings.
[R. 232n.3]. It is undisputed, however, that construction on the crossing at 1700 South
did not begin until at least five months after the Goebel accident, and UTA therefore had
not assumed any responsibility for that crossing at any time prior to the accident. [R.232].
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Martinez was hired to inspect the Right-of-Way to ensure that it was in compliance with
all applicable laws:
Q.
Now on top of these fellows [individuals with the Utah Department
of Transportation and the Federal Railway Administration], you also had
Mr. Martinez inspecting?
A.

Yes.

Q.
And I take it he was to inspect to make sure that you were in
compliance with the federal regulations?
A.

That's correct.

Q.
And also to inspect to make sure you were in compliance with state
law?
A.

Yes.

[R. 234].
Mr. Martinez inspected the entire Joint Trackage every week. [R. 234].
According to his inspection reports, Mr. Martinez inspected the entire line, including the
crossing at 1700 South, on February 16, 1998, three days before the Goebel accident. [R.
234].
Mr. Martinez testified that it was his responsibility to repair anything on the track
or the crossings that was unsafe:
Q.
... You agree that it was your responsibility as a track inspector for
Salt Lake City Southern to take care of things that were unsafe that you
noticed on the crossing A.

Yes.
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Q.
- surface, whether it was for trains going parallel with the rails or
people, including bicyclists, for that matter, going across the rails; correct?
A.

Yes.

A.
Yes, I told you in Sandy and Draper, I fixed the crossings, because it
was dangerous to the public.
[R. 235].
Mr. Martinez further testified:
Q.

... Do you agree that while you were a track inspector for Salt Lake
City Southern that you had the responsibility to look for conditions
on the rubber crossing surface at this intersection, or at this crossing,
17th South and about Second West in Salt Lake City, that might
present a dangerous situation to people going across the tracks,
including bicyclists?

A.

Yes.

[R. 235 (emphasis added)]. During this time frame, Mr. Martinez repaired, on behalf of
SLCS, other crossings along the Right-of-Way. [R. 236].
2.

SLCS Paid Claims Arising from Maintenance of the Joint
Trackage.

In addition to inspecting and maintaining the Joint Trackage, SLCS assumed
responsibility for damages that occurred as a result of defective conditions along the Joint
Trackage. [R. 236-37]. For example, prior to the Goebel accident, SLCS paid a claim to
a woman who claimed that the crossing gate had fallen and hit her window. [R 236].
SLCS also paid a claim to a motorist that had a flat tire from hitting a spike on one of the
crossings. [R. 236-37]. Additionally, when UTA received claims from private citizens, it
13

referred these claims to SLCS. [R. 237]. SLCS did not object to paying for or otherwise
resolving such claims. [R. 237].
E.

Goebel Lawsuit and Decision.

The underlying suit, Goebel v. Omni Products, Inc., was commenced against UTA,
SLCS, and other defendants on January 7, 1999. In their complaint, Edward Goebel and
his wife Kathy Goebel sought to recover for injuries Mr. Goebel suffered in a bicycling
accident. According to the Goebels' complaint, Mr. Goebel's accident occurred at the
railroad crossing at 250 West and 1700 South. The Goebels' alleged, among other things,
that UTA and SLCS had failed to maintain the crossing, and that such failure caused or
contributed to Mr. Goebel's injuries. [R. 237-38]. Specifically, the Goebels alleged that
UTA and SLCS "owed to Plaintiffs duties of reasonable care with respect to maintaining
the subject railroad crossing in good and safe condition for bicycle traffic." [R. 238].
Thus, the essence of the Goebel's claim against UTA and SLCS was an alleged failure to
maintain adequately the crossing surface on the Joint Trackage. [R. 237-38].
F.

Disposition of the Goebel Suit,

Prior to trial, and after incurring more than $160,000 in attorneys' fees and costs,
UTA settled with the Goebels for $75,000. [R. 239]. Rather than settle, SLCS took the
case to trial, ultimately spending more than $500,000 in attorneys' fees and costs to
defend the case. Before submitting the case to the jury, the trial court granted SLCS's
motion for directed verdict. Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Co., 2004 UT
80, % 8, 104 P.3d at 1185 (referring to trial court's ruling) (a copy of the Supreme Court's
14

opinion in Goebel is included in the addendum as Exhibit F). The trial court ruled that
SLCS owed a duty, under Utah law, to maintain the crossing at 1700 South for the safety
of the traveling public because SLCS operates a freight railway along the Right-of-Way.
Id, Nonetheless, the Goebels failed to present any evidence that SLCS had prior notice of
the alleged defect, thus precluding a finding of negligence. Id. ^ 1, 14, 104 P.3d at 1185,
1191. The trial court also found that the Goebels failed to present any evidence or eyewitness testimony that the accident occurred as the Goebels alleged. Id. f 7, 104 P.3d at
1189.
The Goebels appealed the directed verdict in favor of SLCS, and SLCS appealed
the trial court's ruling that SLCS owed a statutory duty of care to the Goebels as a railway
operator. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's directed verdict in
favor of SLCS, and also affirmed the trial court's ruling that SLCS is a "railway
company" within the meaning of the statutes discussed above. The Supreme Court held:
We agree with the Goebels and the trial court that these statutes, by their
plain language, imposed a duty upon Southern to keep the crossing safe for
the traveling public. Although Southern's operation of the railroad tracks in
question is limited to freight service pursuant to the easement, and is
governed by the Agreement, Southern is nonetheless a railroad company
operating a "railway" within the meaning of the statutes, because it operates
trains upon the railroad tracks. ... As the trial court explained, the
"'operating a railway' language . . . is broad enough to encompass
Southern's operation, use and utilization of the easement that they had
supported by the evidence in this particular case." Only different statutory
language or different factual circumstances could convince us that
Southern's regular and longstanding use and control of trains on the railway
did not amount to operation of a railway. The trial court therefore correctly
interpreted the statutes in this regard.
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Goebel 2004 UT 80, % 16, 104 P.3d at 1191 (emphasis added). Because SLCS had a
statutory duty to the Goebels, the Supreme Court declined to consider whether SLCS
owed them a duty under the Coordination Agreement. Id. ^| 33, 104 P.3d at 1196.
G.

Cross-claims for Indemnification.

Shortly after the Goebel lawsuit was filed, UTA gave notice to SLCS, pursuant to
Section 7.5 of the Coordination Agreement, and demanded that SLCS defend and
indemnify UTA with respect to the claim. [R. 238]. SLCS refused. [R. 238]. SLCS
likewise demanded that UTA indemnify, defend and hold harmless SLCS from all losses
and damages with respect to the Goebel lawsuit. [R. 238]. UTA rejected SLCS's
demand because, under the circumstances, UTA had no duty to indemnify or defend
SLCS. [R. 238-39].
UTA therefore filed this action seeking indemnification from SLCS for the
amounts paid to defend and settle the Goebel lawsuit. [R. 239]. SLCS counterclaimed
for indemnification of its defense costs. [R. 239]. The case was decided on crossmotions for summary judgment. Both parties agree there are no disputed issues of
material fact, and this case may be decided as a matter of law. (SLCS Br. at 24).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly ruled that SLCS is required to indemnify UTA for its costs
of defending and settling the Goebel lawsuit. In the Coordination Agreement, the parties
allocated among themselves responsibility for maintaining, repairing, and renewing the
railroad crossing where the Goebel accident occurred. Those maintenance
responsibilities correspond with the parties use of the trackage - when one party alone
was operating on the trackage, that party was responsible to maintain it. It is undisputed
that SLCS alone was operating on the Joint Trackage at the time of the accident, and
SLCS alone had the responsibility to maintain it.
Each of SLCS's attempts to avoid that responsibility should be rejected. The
parties did not agree that SLCS was responsible only to maintain the original condition of
the track, nor did they agree that SLCS was responsible only to maintain it to the
standards it deemed necessary for freight rail service. Instead, SLCS undertook to
maintain the railroad crossings in "good" condition, and to comply with "all applicable
laws and regulations." (Coordination Agreement § 3.3). Those "laws and regulations"
include the state statutes that the Goebels relied upon to sue UTA and SLCS. The Utah
Supreme Court has held that those statutes required SLCS to maintain the crossing in a
safe condition for bicycle traffic, and that SLCS owed Mr. Goebel a duty of care to do so.
joebel 2004 UT 80,fflf16-17, 104 P.3d at 1191. Nothing in the Coordination
Agreement limits SLCS's ability to satisfy this duty of care and SLCS, by its conduct,
emonstrated that it had agreed to do so. Likewise, nothing in the Coordination
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Agreement assigns that responsibility to UTA. Instead, the parties agreed that SLCS and SLCS alone - would make sure the crossing satisfied these requirements.
The Goebels claimed that SLCS and UTA failed to do so. Because the Goebels
claim "arises in connection with" an alleged failure to maintain adequately the railroad
crossing, and because SLCS alone undertook to maintain that crossing, SLCS had a duty
to indemnify and defend UTA. (Coordination Agreement § 7.2(a)). The fact that SLCS
ultimately prevailed is irrelevant - the duty to defend and indemnify attaches irrespective
of fault or negligence.
The trial court properly granted summary judgment to UTA, and properly
dismissed SLCS's counterclaim. That decision should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
L

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF UTA WAS PROPER BECAUSE,
UNDER THE CLEAR TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT, SLCS ASSUMED
ALL MAINTENANCE OBLIGATIONS,
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of UTA because,

under the clear terms of the Coordination Agreement, SLCS assumed responsibility for
maintaining the Joint Trackage. As discussed, the maintenance obligations coincided
with the use of the Joint Trackage. At the time in question, SLCS was the sole operator
along both the Freight Trackage and Joint Trackage and therefore was solely responsible
for the maintenance of both. The clear language of the Coordination Agreement in
conjunction with the applicable statutes and ordinances provides that SLCS was required,
at a minimum, to maintain the Joint Trackage in good condition and to ensure it was safe
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for the traveling public. Nothing in the Coordination Agreement limited SLCS's
maintenance obligations. Likewise, neither statute nor common law relieve SLCS of the
obligations it assumed.
A.

Maintenance, Repair, and Renewal Obligations Correspond with the
Use of the Tracks,

Under the Coordination Agreement, SLCS had the exclusive right to conduct
freight rail operations along the Right-of-Way, and UTA had the exclusive right to
conduct passenger service. Because UTA would not commence passenger service until
several years later, however, SLCS effectively had exclusive use of both the Freight
Trackage and Joint Trackage at the time in question.
In setting forth the exclusive rights of use, the parties also expressly delineated the
maintenance obligations for the Right-of-Way, and those maintenance obligations
correspond directly with the use of the track. Because SLCS had exclusive use of the
Freight Trackage (Coordination Agreement § 5.2), Section 3.1 of the agreement gives
SLCS sole maintenance responsibility for that trackage. It states:
SLS shall be responsible for the maintenance, repair and renewal of the
Freight Trackage and shall maintain, repair and renew the same to the
standards it deems necessary for Freight Rail Service; provided that SLS
shall, at a minimum, maintain, repair and renew the Freight Trackage so as
to preserve the present condition of the track, grade crossings and signal
facilities, as described on Exhibit "B" hereto. SLS shall bear all costs and
expenses of maintenance, repair and renewal of the Freight Trackage.
Nothing herein shall relieve SLS of the obligation to perform maintenance,
repair and renewal on the Freight Trackage in a good and workman-like
manner and in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.
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Likewise, because UTA had exclusive use of the Passenger Trackage (Id. § 5.1), Section
3.2 of the agreement gives UTA sole maintenance responsibility for that trackage. It
states:
UTA shall be responsible for the maintenance, repair and renewal of the
Passenger Trackage and shall maintain, repair and renew the same to the
standards it deems necessary for Passenger Service; UTA shall bear all
costs and expenses of maintenance, repair and renewal of the Passenger
Trackage.
With respect to Joint Trackage, SLCS had exclusive use until UTA commenced
passenger service in late 1999. After that, both parties could use the Joint Trackage,
subject to the terms of the agreement. (Id. § 5.3). Thus, SLCS initially was solely
responsible for maintenance. Section 3.3 of the Coordination Agreement - the provision
at issue here - states:
SLS shall be responsible for and shall pay the cost of the maintenance,
repair and renewal of the Joint Trackage and shall maintain, repair and
renew the same to the standards it deems necessary for Freight Rail
Service; provided that SLS shall, at a minimum, maintain, repair and renew
the Joint Trackage so as to preserve the present condition of track, grade
crossings and signal facilities, as described on Exhibit "ET hereto. Nothing
herein shall relieve SLS of the obligation to perform maintenance, repair
and renewal on the Joint Trackage in a good and workman-like manner and
in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.
That responsibility shifted to UTA when it commenced passenger service:
Upon written notice to SLS at any time, but at least sixty (60) days prior to
commencement of Passenger Service, UTA shall undertake and assume all
costs of maintenance, repair and renewal of the Joint Trackage.
(WL§3.4.)
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It is undisputed that the Goebel accident occurred on the Joint Trackage, and that it
occurred long before UTA commenced passenger service. Therefore, at the time of the
accident, SLCS was solely responsible for maintenance of the 1700 South crossing.
This allocation of maintenance responsibility makes sense because the party using
the track generally is in the best position to maintain, repair, and renew it, and in the best
position to notice any problems. The party using the track also is in the best position to
recognize when the track does not meet all of the requirements for the nature of that
party's use. Indeed, the Coordination Agreement makes numerous references to the
specific needs of a freight rail operator versus that of a passenger service provider. (See,
e.g., id. §§ 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4). The Coordination Agreement even provided that, while it
was the sole operator along the Right-of-Way, SLCS could essentially tailor the
maintenance of the track to enable SLCS to best fulfill its freight carrier operations,
provided, of course, that SLCS maintain the present condition of the track and fully
comply with all applicable laws and regulations. (Id. § 3.3).
B.

Under the Agreement SLCS was Responsible to Maintain, Repair, and
Renew the Crossing At Issue in Good Condition and in Accordance
with All Laws and Regulations,

SLCS's principal argument is that Section 3.3 of the agreement only required it to
taintain the crossings "to the standards it deems necessary for Freight Rail Service," and
iminating the gaps in the rubber pads that that allegedly caused Mr. Goebers accident
is not necessary for freight rail service. (SLCS Br. at 28-31). SLCS, however,
erlooks the balance of Section 3.3, which imposes far broader maintenance obligations.
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Section 3.3, for example, requires SLCS to maintain the maintain the track and grade
crossings in "good" condition. It further provides that SLCS must perform its obligations
"in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations." (Coordination Agreement §
3.3).
1.

SLCS Agreed to Maintain the Crossings in "Good" Condition.

The Coordination Agreement required SLCS to "at a minimum, maintain, repair
and renew the Joint Trackage so as to preserve the present condition of the track, grade
crossings and signal facilities as described on Exhibit 'B' hereto." (Coordination
Agreement § 3.3). Exhibit B to the Coordination Agreement states that the crossings,
including the crossing at 1700 South, are in "good" condition. Thus, SLCS was not
limited to maintenance necessary for Freight Rail Service, as it now contends, but was
instead required, at a minimum, to maintain the crossings in "good" condition.
2.

SLCS Agreed to Maintain and Repair the Crossings in
Accordance with All Applicable Laws.

More important, Section 3.3 expressly states that "[njothing herein shall relieve"
SLCS of its obligation to maintain the crossings "in compliance with all applicable laws
and regulations." (IdL § 3.3). This language is unequivocal, and SLCS's brief does not
even attempt to address it. SLCS assumed responsibility for maintaining the Joint
Trackage in accordance with any and all requirements imposed by federal, state, and local
law. Thus, to the extent the law required that the crossing be maintained for the safety of
the traveling public, including bicyclists, SLCS undertook to do so.
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Under Utah law, a railway company owes a duty of care to maintain the tracks and
grade crossings along which it operates for the safety of the traveling public. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 10-7-26 (2), 10-7-29, 56-1-11; Salt Lake City Code § 14.44.030.
Specifically, section 10-7-26(2) provides that a "railway company" shall
keep[ ] every portion of every street and alley used by it and upon or across
which tracks shall be constructed at or near the grade of such streets in
good and safe condition for public travel, but it shall keep the same
planked, paved, macadamized or otherwise in such condition for public
travel as the governing body of the city or town may from time to time
direct.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-26(2) (2003). "Railway company" is defined as "any company
which owns or operates railway tracks on, along or across a street or alley in any city or
town." Id. § 10-7-26(1). Section 10-7-29 likewise provides that
the tracks of all railway companies when located upon the streets or
avenues of a city or town shall be kept in repair and safe in all respects for
the use of the traveling public, and such companies shall be liable for all
damages resulting by reason of neglect to keep such tracks in repair . . . .
For injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of any such
company to keep its tracks in proper repair . . . such company shall be
liable.. . .
I § 10-7-29 (2003). For purposes of this section, a "railway company" is defined as
oth "any company which owns or operated railway tracks," id- § 10-7-26(1), and as any
>mpany "owning or operating any . . . railway," id- § 10-7-29 (emphasis added).
SLCS argues at length that it is not a "railway company" within the meaning of
ese statutes because it did not own the tracks, but merely used them. (SLCS Br. at 25-

iection 56-1-11 of the Utah Code and Section 14.44.030 of the Salt Lake City Code.
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34). SLCS even makes the surprising statements that "[h]ad UTA and SLCS not entered
into the Agreement, there would be no question that UTA and only UTA owed any
statutory duty to Mr. Goebel" and "[a]s between the parties to this Agreement, UTA
alone, as owner and controller of its railroad, owed the duty imposed by law to 'maintain
good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of travel crosses its road.'" (SLCS
Br. at 27, 36). These statements are surprising because less than a year ago the Utah
Supreme Court specifically held that SLCS owed Mr. Goebel a duty of care under these
very statutes. Goebel 2004 UT 80, Hf 16-17, 104 P.3d at 1191.
In Goebel the Utah Supreme Court held that, as the operator of a freight railway
company, SLCS necessarily had a duty to maintain the crossing at 1700 South for the
safety of the traveling public, including Mr. Goebel. Id. Indeed, the Goebel court
explained that
[o]nly different statutory language or different factual circumstances could
convince us that [SLCSJ's regular and longstanding use and control of trains on the
railway did not amount to operation of a railway.
IdL

While careful to avoid saying so explicitly, SLCS can prevail here only if this
Court reverses the Supreme Court's decision in Goebel. This Court should not - indeed
cannot - do so for at least three reasons.
First, and foremost, Goebel was correctly decided. The Utah Supreme Court's
holding is consistent with the clear language of the statutes and ordinances, and is
consistent with the duties imposed at common law - possessors of land generally have the
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responsibility for maintenance of the land as well as the liability for injuries arising from
the land. See Salt Lake City v. Schubach, 159 P.2d 149, 154 (Utah 1945) (tenant in
exclusive possession has duty to repair); see also D'Errico v. Stop & Shop Co., CV
950368612, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2999 *3 (Conn. Super. Nov. 10, 1997) ("It is the
possession of land that imposes the liability for injuries, rather [than] the ownership of
land . . . because the person in possession is in a position of control and is best able to
prevent harm.") SLCS was the sole operator along the Right-of-Way for nearly seven
years following the execution of the Coordination Agreement. SLCS operated daily
freight service on the railways, servicing numerous customers along the Right-of-Way.
Such longstanding use and control of the Right-of-Way for economic gain was the
primary basis for the Supreme Court's holding that SLCS constituted a railway company
for purposes of imposing these statutory obligations. Goebel, 2004 UT 80, ^[16, 104 P.3d
at 1191.
Second, SLCS is barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion from relitigating this
ssue. Issue preclusion prevents a party from relitigating a "particular issue[ ] that ha[s]
>een contested and resolved." Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ^[34,
6 P.3d 1214, 1221-22. Here, the question whether SLCS is a railway company and a
ailway operator under these statutes, with the duties adherent thereto, was the subject of
LCS's cross-appeal, and was squarely addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Goebel.
he Supreme Court held that SLCS was a "railway company" under the meaning of the
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statute and had a statutory duty to "keep the crossing safe for the traveling public."
Goebel 2004 UT 80, ^[16, 104 P.3d at 1191.
Third, this Court is bound by stare decisis to follow controlling decisions of the
Utah Supreme Court. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Utah 1993) ("This
doctrine, under which the first decision by a court on a particular question of law governs
later decisions by the same court, is a cornerstone of Anglo-American jurisprudence that
is crucial to the predictability of the law and the fairness of adjudication."). Because the
Utah Supreme Court has held, under these very facts and applying the same statutes, that
SLCS owed a duty of care to the Goebels, this Court is bound to follow that decision.
3.

Nothing in the Coordination Agreement Limits SLCS's Ability
to Perform its Maintenance Obligations.

SLCS next argues that its maintenance obligations under Section 3.3 of the
Coordination Agreement are necessarily limited by Sections 2.1 and 4.1 of the agreement.
(SLCS Br. at 32-33). As explained below, these provisions have no application to the
present dispute and, in any event, must be read in conjunction with the more narrow and
specific requirements of Section 3.3.

The fact that the Supreme Court in Goebel cited to a provision of the Coordination
Agreement that deals with Freight Trackage is inapposite. While the Court in Goebel
refers to Section 5.2 of the Coordination Agreement, the Court specifically stated that it
was not interpreting the language of the Coordination Agreement and was not relying on
the provisions of the Coordination Agreement for its decision. Id, f33, 104 P.3d at 1196.
Rather, the Court specifically states that SLCS is a "railway company" under the meaning
of the statute "because it operates trains upon the railroad tracks" and because of its
"longstanding use and control of trains on the railway," two facts which SLCS does not
and cannot contest. Id f 16, 104 P.3d at 1191.
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An agreement "should be read as a whole, in an attempt to harmonize and give
effect to all of the contract provisions." Lee v. Barnes, 1999 UT App 126, %ll9 977 P.2d
550, 551 (citations omitted); Webbank v. Am. Gen Annuity Serv., Corp., 2002 UT 88,
1J18, 54 P.3d 1139, 1144 (explaining that "we consider each contract provision . . . in
relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none").
"Provisions which are apparently conflicting are to be reconciled and harmonized, if
possible, by reasonable interpretation so that the entire agreement can be given effect."
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 n.l (Utah Ct.
App. 1987); accord Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, fl2-13,40 P.3d
599, 605. Indeed, it is universally accepted that a court must reject any interpretation
which will nullify one or more of the contractual provisions. See id- Likewise, courts
"may not rewrite [a] contract... if the language is clear." Utah Farm Bur. Ins. Co. v.
Crook, 1999 UT 47, f 6, 980 P.2d 685, 686 (citation omitted).
SLCS's reliance on Section 2.1 to limit its maintenance obligations is misplaced,
ndeed, neither Section 2.1, nor any other provision in Section 2 of the agreement, makes
my reference whatsoever to maintenance, repair, or renewal obligations. Rather, Section
M (along with Sections 5.1 and 5.4) are intended only to limit the type of business
ctivities that SLCS can perform on the Right-of-Way, and when it can perform them,
famely, SLCS can only provide freight rail service, it cannot provide passenger service,
cannot operate on Passenger Trackage, and it cannot operate on the Joint Trackage
iring the Passenger Preference Periods without special permission. Section 2.2 (along
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with Sections 5.2 and 5.5) are the direct corollary - under these provisions, UTA cannot
provide freight rail service, it cannot operate on Freight Trackage, and it cannot operate
on the Joint Trackage during the Freight Preference Period without special permission.
The delineation of permitted business uses on the Right-of-Way cannot be construed in
any way to limit the express maintenance obligations set forth in Section 3 of the
agreement.
Indeed, SLCS's arguments are internally inconsistent. If Section 2.1 is read as
broadly as SLCS now suggests - that it prohibits SLCS from doing anything on the Rightof-Way other than provide freight rail service, then it would prohibit SLCS from doing
any maintenance whatsoever on the trackage. SLCS, however, admits that it was required
to perform maintenance necessary to preserve the original condition of the track. (SLCS
Br. at 28). Section 2.1 plainly does not prohibit SLCS from performing maintenance on
the trackage, and SLCS admits this. These maintenance obligations are addressed in
Section 3.3 of the agreement, not Section 2.1.
However, even if Section 2.1 could not reconciled with Section 3.3 (which we
submit is not the case), Section 3.3 must be given greater weight. In interpreting
contractual provisions, "'[s]pecific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than
general language."5 Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Svs.. 731 P.2d 475,480 (Utah
1986) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(c)). Here, Section 2.1 is a
general provision providing that SLCS shall only be permitted to conduct Freight Rail
Service on the Right-of-Way, whereas Section 3.3 specifically sets forth that SLCS shall
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be responsible for maintaining, repairing, and renewing the track, grade crossings, and
signal facilities on the Joint Trackage. The specific provisions of Section 3 3 control over
the general provisions of Section 2.1.
Likewise, Section 4.1 does not apply to ordinary maintenance and repair work on
the Joint Trackage. Rather, Section 4.1 simply precludes SLCS from making
"modifications" without first obtaining UTA's approval. The Coordination Agreement
defines "modifications" as:
Alterations or additions to, or removal of, then-existing trackage on the
Right-of-Way, including but not limited to new connections, and changes in
railroad communication systems, signal or dispatching facilities.
(Coordination Agreement § 1). The Goebel case involved an alleged failure to maintain
properly the rubber panels between the tracks. (SLCS Br. at 8-9). The Goebels did not
contend that UTA and SLCS were obligated to alter, add to, or remove the "then-existing
rackage" - i.e., the rails. Indeed, simply changing the rails presumably would have left
he allegedly defective rubber panels in place. Likewise, the Goebel case had nothing to
lo with adding connections to the track or changing the "railroad communications
ystems, signal or dispatching facilities." The Goebel case arose in connection with
rdinary maintenance, not "modifications" as that term is defined in the agreement. But

Again, SLCS's argument is internally inconsistent. SLCS admits it was responsible for
aintenance necessary to preserve the original condition of the track. (SLCS Br. at 28).
X S does not contend that it was required to obtain UTA's prior written consent to do
, or that it was required to enter into a Modification Agreement with UTA, as would be
quired by Section 4.1. Indeed, SLCS regularly maintained the track and crossings
thout UTA's prior consent, and without a Modification Agreement. [R. 233-37].
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even if remedying the alleged negligent state of the crossing at issue in this case required
"modifications/5 Section 4.1 permits SLCS to undertake such modifications if it
"reasonably determines that Modifications are required to accommodate its Freight Rail
Service." (Id, § 4.1). The only way that SLCS would be prohibited from performing such
modifications would be if UTA denied SLCS's request to do so, and in this case SLCS
never requested to make any "modifications" to the crossing, and UTA therefore could
not have denied any such request.
In summary, the "applicable laws and regulations" referenced in the Coordination
Agreement require, at a minimum, that SLCS maintain the track and grade crossing in
question for the safety of the traveling public, including Mr. Goebel. Nothing in the
Coordination Agreement limited or prevented SLCS from complying with these
contractual and statutory obligations.
C.

UTA Did Not Retain Any of the Maintenance Obligations for the Joint
Trackage, Under the Agreement, Statute, or Common Law.

UTA did not retain, whether through the Coordination Agreement, by operation of
statute, or by common law, any maintenance obligations for the Joint Trackage for the
time in question. SLCS does not point to a not a single provision in the Coordination
Agreement assigning to UTA any of the Joint Trackage maintenance obligations for the
period of time in question. Rather, section 3.3 unequivocally states that SLCS "shall be
responsible for and shall pay the costs of the maintenance, repair and renewal of the Joint

"Modifications" under Section 4.1 plainly do not include ordinary maintenance and
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Trackage

" Nor is there any mention in the Coordination Agreement that UTA is to

oversee any of SLCS's maintenance obligations.
Conceding that the Coordination Agreement does not expressly assign to UTA any
Joint Trackage maintenance obligations for the time in question, SLCS argues that the
agreement does so by implication. Specifically, SLCS points out that Sections 3.1, 3.2
and 3.4 include the word "all" when referring to maintenance, but Section 3.3 omits the
word "all." Based on the omission of this single word, SLCS argues that UTA retained
some entirely undefined maintenance obligations. (SLCS Br. at 30). SLCS is wrong for
at least two reasons. First, the term "all," as used in Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4 of the
Coordination Agreement, refers to the costs and expenses of maintenance and not the
allocation of the maintenance obligations themselves. Thus, at the very best, the omission
of this word would be of significance only if this was a dispute over who was obligated to
Day the costs of maintenance. Second, although not using the term "all," Section 3.3 in
10 way suggests that SLCS's obligation to perform and bear the costs of maintenance,
epair, and renewal of the Joint Trackage is anything less than "all." If there was some
^sidual maintenance obligation that UTA was to bear, the parties surely would have said
:>mething about it.
The fact that Utah law may impose maintenance obligations on both UTA, as the
vner of a track, and on SLCS, as the operator of a railroad along the track, does not
ean that UTA necessarily retained some of the Joint Trackage maintenance obligations.

3air.
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There is absolutely nothing in the statutes or common law that prevents parties from
assigning all of the obligations, as well as the liability for these obligations, to one party.
This is precisely what UTA and SLCS did here.6 Indeed, that is the very purpose of
indemnification agreements - to require one party to assume the risk arising with respect
to specific contractual duties. SLCS's assumption of the maintenance obligations of the
Joint Trackage, as well as the liability for all damages arising in connection with these
obligations, in no way affected the rights of any third parties, and was not contrary to
public policy. Therefore, absent an express statutory prohibition, UTA and SLCS were
free to delegate all of the Joint Trackage maintenance obligations, as well as the attendant
liability, to SLCS.
In summary, nothing in the language of the Coordination Agreement provides that
UTA retained any maintenance obligations with regard to the Joint Trackage. Likewise,
neither Utah statute nor Utah common law impose any owner-specific maintenance
obligations that were not and could not be contractually assumed by SLCS.
D.

SLCS, By Its Conduct, Acknowledged These Responsibilities*

The intent of UTA and SLCS is best evidenced by the parties' conduct under the
Coordination Agreement prior to this dispute. SLCS's performance under the agreement,

6

In its Brief, SLCS argues that "[njothing in the statutes or the ordinance relied upon by
the Goebels suggest that the owner of the tracks can delegate the duty imposed upon it by
those enactments so as to be free from its statutory and ordinance based responsibilities."
(SLCS Br. at 27 (emphasis added)). This argument misses the point. UTA is not
claiming that delegating statutory duties to SLCS freed it from those duties (though, as
discussed below, it is not clear whether UTA had them in the first place). Instead, UTA is
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prior to this dispute, demonstrates that the parties intended for SLCS to assume all
maintenance obligations for the Joint Trackage at the time in question, and the consequent
liability for allegedly failing to do so. "[I]n the interpretation of contracts, the
interpretation given by the parties themselves as shown by their acts will be adopted by
the court." Hardinge Co. v. EIMCO Corpr 266 P.2d 494, 496 (Utah 1964): see also Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha, 230 U.S. 100, 118 (1913) (practical interpretation by parties
to contract is "compelling"); Teachers Insur. & Annuity Assoc, of Am. v. Ocwne
Financial Corp., No. 98 Civ. 7137, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2560, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
19, 2002) ("Perhaps the most persuasive evidence of the intention of the parties when
entering an agreement is their course of performance under the agreement.").
Here, the intention of both SLCS and UTA is plainly evidenced by their course of
>erformance. This course of performance should be "deemed of great, if not compelling
tifluence." Old Colony Trust Co., 230 U.S. at 118.
SLCS, in large part, adhered to its maintenance obligations through 1999 by
ispecting the Joint Trackage on a regular basis, by repairing portions of the Joint
rackage, and by assuming sole liability for claims arising with respect to the Joint
rackage. Despite its current claim that Section 3.3 did not require it to do so, SLCS
nducted regular inspections of the Joint Trackage, including the track, grade crossings,
d signal facilities, and also regularly repaired the Joint Trackage. SLCS hired Mr.
irtinez to perform weekly inspections of the entire track line and to perform the

iming that SLCS agreed to defend and indemnify UTA if it is sued for violating them.
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necessary repairs on the track and grade crossings. SLCS inspected the Right-of-Way,
including the crossing in question, just three days prior to the Goebel accident. Perhaps
most significant, Mr. Martinez testified that he believed he had "the responsibility to look
for conditions on the rubber crossing surface at this intersection, or at this crossing, 17
South and about Second West in Salt Lake City, that might present a dangerous situation
to people going across the tracks, including bicyclists." [R. 235 (emphasis added)].
SLCS also repaired grade crossings on the Joint Trackage both before and after the
Goebel accident. [R. 236]. In addition to inspecting and repairing the crossings, SLCS
paid claims arising out of defects in crossings on the Joint Trackage. Specifically,
SLCRS paid a claim to a woman who claimed that a crossing gate had fallen and hit the
window of her car. SLCS also paid to replace a tire where the motorist claimed that a
spike at a crossing damaged the motorist's tire. [R. 236-37]. In neither instance did
SLCS see fit even to inform UTA that it was doing so; SLCS apparently was so confident
of its obligations that it did not believe UTA even needed to know about it. UTA, for its
part, performed accordingly - when issues were brought to UTA's attention by third
parties, UTA forwarded this information directly to SLCS, who handled them without
dispute. [R. 237].
SLCS's and UTA's course of performance under the Coordination Agreement is of
"compelling influence," Old Colony Trust Co.. 230 U.S. at 118, and the "interpretation
given by the parties themselves as shown by their acts [should] be adopted by the court."
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Hardinge, 266 P.2d at 494. This alone is sufficient to affirm the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to UTA.
II.

SLCS AGREED TO INDEMNIFY UTA FOR ANY LOSS ARISING IN
CONNECTION WITH MAINTENANCE OF JOINT TRACKAGE.
A.

The Plain Language of the Agreement Requires SLCS to Indemnify
UTA.

The Coordination Agreement establishes who shall be liable to a third party injured
due to the act or omission, whether negligent or not, of one of the parties. (Coordination
Agreement § 7.2.) Specifically, section 7.2 provides:
Notwithstanding (i) anything else contained in this Coordination
Agreement or (ii) otherwise applicable law regarding allocation of liability
based on fault or otherwise, as between the parties hereto liability for Loss
or Damage resulting from or in connection with the maintenance,
construction, operations or other acts or omissions of either party shall be
borne and paid by the parties as follows:
(a) When such Loss or Damage results from or arises in connection with
the maintenance, construction, operations or other acts or omissions of
only one of the parties, regardless of any third party involvement, such
Loss or Damage shall be borne by that party
he Coordination Agreement further provides that
Each party agrees that it will pay for all Loss or Damage the risk of which
it has herein assumed, the judgment of any court to the contrary and
otherwise applicable law regarding liability notwithstanding, and will
forever indemnify, protect, defend and hold harmless the other party, its
successors and assigns, from such payment.
L § 7.3.)
It is uncontested that the Goebel suit arose in connection with the
intenance of, or other acts or omissions with respect to, the Joint Trackage, and
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that UTA incurred losses and damages as a result of the Goebel suit. As explained
above, SLCS - not UTA - was required to maintain the crossing. Thus, UTA's
loss or damage arose "in connection with the . . . acts or omissions of only
[SLCS]" and UTA is entitled to indemnification.
B.

SLCS Incorrectly Claims that the Agreement Precludes
Indemnification.

SLCS first argues that this Court must ignore the Supreme Court's holding in
Goebel because Section 7.1 of the Coordination Agreement states that "[e]ach party
agrees that it will pay for all Loss or Damage the risk of which it has herein assumed, the
judgment of any court to the contrary and otherwise applicable law regarding liability
notwithstanding . . . . " (SLCS Br. at 39-40). SLCS is wrong for at least two reasons:
First, SLCS's entire argument is premised on the (incorrect) assumption that UTA, and
UTA alone, was responsible for maintenance necessary to comply with applicable statutes
and ordinances. (SLCS Br. at 36). Because Goebel squarely held the opposite, this Court
cannot ignore that holding, and erroneously proceed from SLCS's faulty premise.
Second, this provision would apply only if UTA had remained in the case, and only if
UTA had been found liable. In those circumstances, SLCS would be required to
indemnify UTA notwithstanding a jury's determination that UTA was at fault.
SLCS next claims that if this Court applies the ruling in Goebel the Court must
find that neither party is entitled to indemnification under the Coordination Agreement.
(SLCS Br. at 39-40). Because this argument is raised for the first time on appeal, the
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Court should decline to consider it. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f41, 63 P.3d 731, 744
("[I]ssues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on a p p e a l . . . . unless the
petitioner demonstrates that 'plain error' occurred or 'exceptional circumstances exist."
(citations omitted)).
Not only did SLCS fail to raise this issue below, this argument is without merit for
at least two reasons. First SLCS's argument incorrectly assumes that the Goebel decision
necessary applies the same statutory duties to UTA. The Goebel decision, however, in no
way addresses UTA's statutory duties with regard to the crossing in question. The
Goebel decision applies only to SLCS's statutory duties to maintain the Joint Trackage,
md the crossings, for the safety of the traveling public. 2004 UT ^ 16, 104 P.3d at 1191.
Hie court explained that its holding was fact-specific, and was informed by the fact that
1LCS "operates trains upon the railroad tracks" and had a history of "regular and
mgstanding use and control of the trains on the railway." Id. The same was not true of
TA. At the time in question, UTA was not regularly operating trains along the Right-ofr

ay. In fact, UTA did not commence passenger service along the Right-of-Way until

>99, nearly seven years after purchasing the Right-of-Way. Thus, Goebel did not
dress UTA's statutory duties, if any, and does not preclude a finding of
lemnification.
Second, and even more fundamental, even if UTA owed the Goebels the same
utory duties as SLCS, SLCS's argument incorrectly assumes that such statutory duties
e not and could not be assigned among the parties by private agreement. Under the
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Coordination Agreement, SLCS assumed all obligations relating to the maintenance,
repair, and renewal of the Joint Trackage, including all duties imposed by statute.
(Coordination Agreement § 3.3.) There is no legal prohibition against delegating this
responsibility via private agreement. Rather, Utah law recognizes the right of two parties
to assign the risk of liability to third parties between themselves. See Freund v. Utah
Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990).7 Thus, even if both parties owed a
duty of care to the Goebels, SLCS as an operator and UTA as an owner, SLCS agreed
that it would satisfy these duties and indemnify UTA for its failure to do so. UTA was
therefore entitled to summary judgment.8
Finally, SLCS argues that neither UTA nor SLCS is entitled to indemnification
because there was no finding of liability. (SLCS Br. at 40). SLCS's indemnification
obligation is a contractual duty that attaches irrespective of either party's negligence, or
lack thereof. See kL; RUSS V. Woodside Homes. Inc.. 905 P.2d 901, 905-06 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995). The fact that SLCS obtained a directed verdict and there was no finding of

The Utah Legislature has stated that indemnification provisions between certain
parties are against public policy and are void and unenforceable. See, e.g., Utah Code
Ann. § 13-8-1(2) (stating that indemnification provisions in construction contracts are
void and unenforceable). No such express provision is included with regard to the duties
of railway companies, and SLCS does not argue otherwise.
8
SLCS also cites Section 7.1(b), which states that "[w]hen such Loss or Damage
results from or arises in connection with the acts or omission of both parties . . . such
liability shall be borne by the party or parties responsible under applicable law." (SLCS
Br. at 38). This section would apply only if the Coordination Agreement provided that
both SLCS and UTA were responsible for maintaining the Joint Trackage at the time in
question. As explained above, SLCS - and only SLCS - had maintenance obligations for
the Joint Trackage at the time in question.
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liability in Goebel is therefore irrelevant to SLCS's indemnification obligations. The
indemnification provision does not require a finding of fault - all that is required is that
the loss or damage "arise[] in connection with" the performance or omission of SLCS's
maintenance obligations, and it is undisputed that the Goebels claim satisfies this
requirement.
III.

SLCS'S CLAIM FOR INDEMNIFICATION FROM UTA WAS PROPERLY
DISMISSED.
SLCS asks the Court to remand the case with instructions to enter judgment in

favor of SLCS on its counterclaim for indemnification. (SLCS Br. at 42). SLCS is not,
mder any scenario, entitled to indemnification from UTA. To find in favor of SLCS
vould require the Court to ignore both the plain language of the Coordination Agreement
s well as the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Goebel. Indeed, SLCS admits that if this
"ourt follows the Supreme Court's decision in Goebel, SLCS is not entitled to
idemnification from UTA. (See SLCS Br. at 39 ("If SLCSR and UTA both failed to
>mply with the same law, neither is entitled to indemnity by the terms of.. . section [7.1
'the agreement].")).
As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Goebel, the statutes and ordinances
plicable to SLCS required SLCS to maintain the crossings for the safety of Mr. Goebel.
)4 UT f 16, 104 P.3d at 1191. SLCS has not, and cannot, point to any provision in the
Drdination Agreement whereby UTA assumed SLCS's statutory duties to Mr. Goebel.
>ent some contractual assignment by SLCS to UTA of SLCS's statutory duties - and
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SLCS can identify none - SLCS is not entitled to indemnification. SLCS's counterclaim
was properly dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly held that SLCS assumed responsibility for the
maintenance of the Joint Trackage and agreed to indemnify and hold harmless UTA for
any loss or damage arising in connection with the performance or failure to perform these
responsibilities. SLCS was required to maintain the Joint Trackage for the safety of the
traveling public, including Mr. Goebel, both under statutory law and pursuant to the
Coordination Agreement. Because the Goebels' claim arose in connection with an
alleged failure to do so, SLCS was required to indemnify and hold harmless UTA.
Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of UTA, and SLCS's
claims were properly dismissed. This Court should affirm the decision of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of August 2005.
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.

Todd M. Shaughnessy
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of August, 2005, two true and correct copies of
the foregoing was placed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the
following:
E. Scott Savage
Casey K. McGarvey
BERMAN & SAVAGE
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-26(2); Utah Code Ann § 10-7-29; Utah Code Ann.
§ 56-1-11, Salt Lake City Ordinance § 14.44.030.

B.

Ruling and Order, dated March 2, 2005.

C.

Judgment, dated March 10, 2005.

D.

Retained Freight Operating Easement
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Administration and Coordination Agreement
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Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Co.. 2004 UT 80, 104, P.3d
1185
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2005 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All nghts reserved
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2005 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2005 UT 12, 2005 UT APP 90 ***
*** MARCH 1, 2005 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 10 UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE
CHAPTER 7. MISCELLANEOUS POWERS OF CITIES AND TOWNS
ARTICLE 7. LEVY OF SPECIAL TAXES BY CITIES AND TOWNS
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann § 10-7-26 (2005)
0-7-26 Streets and alleys used by railway compames
) As used m this section and m Sections 10-7-27, 10-7-29, 10-7-30, 10-7-31, 10-7-32, and 10-7-33, the terms "railcompany" or "street railway company" means any company which owns or operates railway tracks on, along or
ss a street or alley in any city or town.
(2) Nothing contained m this section or in the sections referred to in Subsection (1) shall be construed to exempt
ailway company from keepmg every portion of every street and alley used by it and upon or across which tracks
be constructed at or near the grade of such streets m good and safe condition for public travel, but it shall keep the
planked, paved, macadamized or otherwise in such condition for public travel as the governing body of the city or
may from time to time direct, keepmg the plank, pavement or other surface of the street or alley level with the top
> rails of the track The portions of the streets or alleys to be so kept and maintained by all such railway companies
include all the space between their different rails and tracks and also a space outside of the outer rail of each outrack of at least two feet in width, and the tracks herem referred to shall include not only the mam tracks but also all
acks, crossings and turnouts constructed for the use of such railways.
ORY: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 259; C.L. 1917, § 677; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-7-25; L. 1969, ch. 27, § 42.

:s:
S-REFERENCES -Municipal Improvement District Act, § 17A-3-301 et seq.
S TO DECISIONS
) in Goebel v Salt Lake City S R R Co, 2004 UT80, 509 Utah Adv Rep 39, 104 P 3d 1185

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2005 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2005 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2005 UT 12, 2005 UT APP 90 ***
*** MARCH 1, 2005 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 10. UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE
CHAPTER 7. MISCELLANEOUS POWERS OF CITIES AND TOWNS
ARTICLE 7. LEVY OF SPECIAL TAXES BY CITIES AND TOWNS
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-29 (2005)
0-7-29. Railway companies to repave streets
1 railway companies shall be required to pave or repave at their own cost all the space between their different rails
bracks and also a space two feet wide outside of the outer rails of the outside tracks in any city or town, including all
racks, crossings and turnouts used by such companies. Where two or more companies occupy the same street or
with separate tracks each company shall be responsible for its proportion of the surface of the street or alley occuby all the parallel tracks as herein required. Such paving or repaving by such railway companies shall be done at
ime time and shall be of the same material and character as the paving or repaving of the streets or alleys upon
I the track or tracks are located, unless other material is specially ordered by the municipality. Such railway coms shall be required to keep that portion of the street which they are herein required to pave or repave in good and
r repair, using for that purpose the same material as the street upon which the track or tracks are laid at the point of
or such other material as the governing body of the city may require and order; and as streets are hereafter paved
aved street railway companies shall be required to lay in the best approved manner a rail to be approved by the
ling body of the city. The tracks of all railway companies when located upon the streets or avenues of a city or
hall be kept in repair and safe in all respects for the use of the traveling public, and such companies shall be liable
damages resulting by reason of neglect to keep such tracks in repair, or for obstructing the streets. For injuries to
s or property arising from the failure of any such company to keep its tracks in proper repair and free from ob>ns such company shall be liable and the city or town shall be exempt from liability. The word "railway compa> used in this section shall be taken to mean and include any persons, companies, corporations or associations
or operating any street or other railway in any city or town.
RY: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 266; C.L. 1917, § 684; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-7-28.
TO DECISIONS
SIS
epair streets,
gainst improvement,
on of franchise.

O REPAIR STREETS.

Pagez
Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-29

Street railroad was not liable for injuries to person driving a horse-drawn cart which overturned when it ran upon a
pile of stone left in the street by a party which had contracted with the city and the raikoad to build a crosswalk, in absence of evidence that the railway track was out of repak or that there was any obstruction upon it at the time of accident. Naylor v. Salt Lake City, 9 Utah 491, 35 P. 509 (1894),
PROTEST AGAINST IMPROVEMENT.
Raikoad company owning lots abutting on a street included within a proposed pavmg district had the right to file its
protest to the proposed improvement the same as any other private owner of property fronting on the street. Cave v.
Ogden City, 51 Utah 166, 169 P. 163 (1917).
REVOCATION OF FRANCHISE.
City could revoke a franchise and requke a raikoad to remove its tracks for refusal to abide by a covenant of the franchise ordinance requking the track to conform to any changes in grade made by the city. Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Service Comm., 103 Utah 186, 134 P.2d 469 (1943).
CITED in Goebel v. Salt Lake City S R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80, 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 104 P.3d 1185.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2005 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2005 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2005 UT 12, 2005 UT APP 90 ***
*** MARCH 1, 2005 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 56. RAILROADS
CHAPTER!. GENERAL PROVISIONS
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11 (2005)
6-1-11. Maintenance of crossings

ery railroad company shall be liable for damages caused by its neglect to make and maintain good and sufficient
sings at points where any line of travel crosses its road.
TORY: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 445; C.L. 1917, § 1237; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 77-0-11.
ES:
3S-REFERENCES. -Gates at crossings, § 10-8-83.
ulation of crossings, § 10-8-34 et seq.
>ping at crossings, duties of buses and certain trucks, § 41-6-97.
IS TO DECISIONS
,YSIS
butory negligence.
wed public by railroad.
and sufficient crossing."
actions.
tions of law and fact.
gfUBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
iff who was driving horse-drawn, covered milk wagon alongside railroad track in place of safety and without
attempted to cross track in front of engine whereupon he was struck was negligent as a matter of law and was
led to recovery for personal injuries on ground that defendant railroad could, by exercise of ordinary care, have
i going into place of danger and prevented accident. Wilkinson v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 35 Utah 110, 99 P.
*).
W E D PUBLIC BY RAILROAD.
iving his sheep along a public street through which a railroad ran was not trespasser, thus the railroad owed him
t only to operate its train with due care after discovering the sheep on the track and in perilous situation, but
e care in operation of its train in anticipation of dangers that might reasonably be expected to arise from the
5 of the highway by the public. Smith v. San Pedro, LA. & S.L.R.R., 35 Utah 390, 100 P. 673 (1909).

Fagez
Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11

Under this section, a railroad has a duty to the traveling public to maintain good and sufficient crossings, and is liable
for unsafe crossings regardless of materials used for its construction or maintenance. Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R.,
112 Utah 189, 186P.2d293 (1947), opinion amended and rehearing denied, 112 Utah 218, 189 P.2d 701 (1948).
This section imposes a duty upon a railroad to keep its crossings safe for the traveling public, but because negligence
would be the basis of liability for breach of the duty, and notice of a dangerous condition is a fundamental component of
negligence, the duty imposed by the statute does not give rise to liability in the absence of notice. Goebel v. Salt Lake
City S. R.R. Co., 2004 UT80, 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 104 P3d 1185.
"GOOD AND SUFFICIENT CROSSING."
- INSTRUCTIONS.
Instruction that "good and sufficient crossing" is crossing that is sufficient and ordinarily safe for traveling public to
pass to and fro over, keeping in mind its location, whether in sparsely settled or populous locality, and the character and
volume of traffic that ordinarily may be expected to pass over it, was proper. Denkers v. Southern Pac. Co., 52 Utah 18,
171 P 999 (1918).
In wrongful-death action against railroad arising out of truck-train collision at crossing, instruction that crossing must
be maintained to width equal to main-traveled portion of highway was substantially in accordance with this section, and
refusal to instruct jury that railroad had duty to maintain crossing for width of sixteen feet was not error, especially
where width of crossing had no causal connection with collision. Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R., 112 Utah 189, 186
P.2d293 (1947), opinion amended and rehearing denied, 112 Utah 218, 189 P2d 701 (1948).
Failure to give requested instruction in words of city ordinance on duty to plank or pave crossing was not prejudicial
error in wrongful-death action against railroad arising out of truck-train collision at crossing, where instruction on maintenance of crossing was given in words of this section, and was adequate to permit jury to find for plaintiffs if jurors
believed from evidence that deceased was stalled because of improperly maintained crossing. Van Wagoner v. Union
Pac. R.R., 112 Utah 189, 186P.2d293 (1947), opinion amended and rehearing denied, 112 Utah 218, 189 P.2d 701
(1948).
- QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT.
There being no statute specifically defining a "good and sufficient" crossing, the question of whether a certain crossing is good and sufficient is ordinarily one for jury to determine from evidence adduced, unless it clearly appears that
only one conclusion can be reasonably drawn from evidence respecting condition of crossing, in which case it becomes
question of law for court. Denkers v. Southern Pac. Co., 52 Utah 18, 171 P. 999 (1918).
PLEADING.
Complaint alleging that defendant railroad, knowing that sheep were on its track, negligently and carelessly ran, managed, operated and controlled a train so as to strike the sheep stated a good cause of action. Smith v. San Pedro, L.A. &
S.L.R.R., 35 Utah 390, WOP. 673 (1909).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AM. JUR. 2D. -65 Am. Jur. 2d Railroads § 480 et seq.
C.J.S. - 7 4 C.J.S. Railroads § 472.
A.L.R. —Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity, 6 A.L.R.3d 1326.
Contributory negligence of child injured while climbing over or through railroad train blocking crossing, 11 A.L.R. 3d
1168.
Governmental liability for failure to reduce vegetation obscuring view at railroad crossing or at street or highway intersection, 22 A.L.RAth 624.
Liability of railroad or other private landowner for vegetation obscuring view at railroad crossing, 66 A.L.RAth 885.

14.44.010

14,44.030

Grade crossings—Planking and
paving.
A. Every railway company operating within the
boundaries of the city shall keep every portion of
every city street or alley upon or across which their
tracks shall be or are constructed and maintained in
good and safe condition to accommodate public
travel For this purpose, each railway company will
install and maintain the materials required in the
manner specified from time to time in writing by
the mayor to surface and maintain the same in good
condition for public travel.
B. The portions of the street or alley surfaces to
be so maintained by all such railway companies
shall include all the space between their different
rails and tracks and also the space outside the outer
rail of each outside track for a distance of two feet,
measured from the outside edge of the rail, for the
full width of the.street or alley, including sidewalks,
or length of said street or alley, unless otherwise
directed by the mayor.
C. At all times, the surface of the street or alley
shall be maintained level with the top of the rails on
the track. After being directed in writing to surface
or perform maintenance work on an area of trackage, each such railway company shall complete the
work specified by the mayor within seven days on
small roadway repairs or thirty days for major capital improvements, or such other reasonable time as
specified by the city. Every railway company which
fails or refuses to comply with such notice, within
the time specified, shall pay to the city all costs and
expenses incurred by the city or others at its direction for performing the required surfacing and/or
maintenance work and the city may thereafter recover such costs and expenses, including attorneys fees
incidental thereto, in a civil action brought against
such railway company in any court having jurisdiction thereof. (Prior code § 35-1-5)
14.44.040

Viaducts and bridges—Required
when.
Such railroads shall, when required by the mayor,
construct suitable viaducts over all streets when life
or property may be endangered by the ordinary
ibull i^*kc O i \ » 9Bi
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FUEL DISTRICT COORT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
r

JTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY
Plaintiff,

RULING and ORDER
CASE NO. 030906885
DATE: MARCH 2, 2005

vs,
ALT LAKE CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD
O., INC.,
Defendant.

The above matter came before the Court on oral argument on
bruary 28, 2005, on the parties' cross-motions

for summary

dgment, pursuant to Rule 7. Plaintiff was present through Todd M.
auhgnessy and defendant was present through E. Scott Savage.
fendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, supported by
lorandum on June 30, 2004. Meanwhile, Plaintiff filed its motion
I supporting memorandum on August 12, 2004. Both Plaintiff and
endant

filed memoranda opposing

the respective motions on

tember 29, 2004. Both reply memoranda were filed on October 29,
1.

The court heard oral argument and took the matter under

Lsement. Having considered the case file, the motions and the
•randa submitted by the parties, and the arguments made in open
t, the Court enters the following decision.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a complaint March 26, 2003.
sought indemnification from defendant SLS.

The complaint

The complaint alleged

that it settled a claim against Goebel who was injured while
crossing a rail owned by plaintiff but that SLS had the duty of
maintenance and repair.

The claim is that in 1992 plaintiff

acquired from Union Pacific (UP) a railroad right of way, but UP
maintained a right of way for freight service and UP then assigned
that right to freight service to SLS. On March 31, 1993, the
parties entered into a Coordination Agreement, which is at the
heart of this lawsuit. The complaint quotes various provisions of
that agreement and relies on those to support its claims.

In

January, 1999, Goebel filed suit against both parties, as well as
others, based on an accident at the intersection of 1700 South and
approximately 200 West in Salt Lake City.

Plaintiff notified

defendant of the action and demanded indemnification and defendant
denied its responsibility. In September, 2002, plaintiff settlec
with Goebel.

The complaint

is in causes of action

for (1J

contractual indemnification, (2) implied indemnity, and (3) commo]
law indemnity.
On May 19, 2003, defendant filed an answer and counterclaim
It denied the essential allegations, relied on provisions of tl~
-2-

Coordinating Agreement, and in the counterclaim asserted the same
three causes of action maintaining plaintiff was required to
indemnify defendant for its substantial costs in defending the
lawsuit brought by Goebel.
Goebel's complaint against these parties and others alleged
Goebel was involved in a bicycle accident while crossing the tracks
/hich resulted in serious and permanent injuries.

It alleged

gainst the manufacturer of the product used between the tracks
arious products liability theories and negligence.

As against

laintiff herein, UTA, Goebel asserted a cause for negligence for
ailing to properly maintain the intersection in a good and safe
mdition

for bicycle traffic.

As to defendant herein that

>mplaint alleged a possessory interest by defendant and the same
use of action for negligence, a breach of the duty to properly
intain the intersection in a good and safe condition for bicycle
affic. A second amended complaint added a cause of action against
L defendants and alleged the intersection was a nuisance as the
;s and omissions of all defendants, including UP and Salt Lake
y, rendered the intersection dangerous and a nuisance.
These motions followed plaintiff's reply to the counterclaim.

DISCUSSION
The parties ask the Court to interpret, as a matter of law,

whether a contract setting forth their mutual obligations to
indemnify requires Plaintiff ("UTA"), or Defendant ("SLS"), to bear
the responsibility for an injury which was claimed due to the
allegedly negligent condition of a crossing owned by the Plaintiff
and then in use by the Defendant,
In 1993, UTA and SLS contracted for the use of UTA's right of
way over property upon which rail trackage and road crossings are
present.

The agreement classifies the right of way property in

three types, (1) Passenger trackage; (2) Freight trackage; and (3)
Joint trackage, with UTA retaining the right to redesignate any
trackage, UTA retained the right to exclusive use of the Passenger
trackage, SLS was granted exclusive use of the Freight trackage at
only certain times and on certain days, and SLS was granted the
initial use of the Joint trackage, including the section of track
crossing 1700 South at approximately 200 West in Salt Lake City,
where the accident occurred. At all times relevant to the present
action, the Joint trackage remained in SLS's control because SLS
was using the tracks for freight, UTA was in the process of
upgrading

track

for light rail at or about the time of the

accident, though UTA had not altered the tracks at this crossing.
The parties disagree completely who was in "control" of the tracks,
SLS arguing with some persuasiveness that UTA owned the tracks anc
had vast control over many aspects of the trackage. However, as o

-4-

the date of the accident in 1998 there was no passenger traffic
along the rails of any kind and UTA had the sole and exclusive
right to use the trackage for passenger traffic.

SLS's right to

use was coupled with its obligation to "at a minimum, maintain,
repair, and renew the Joint trackage so as to preserve the present
condition of track, grade crossings, and signal facilities[.]"
Coordination Agreement at 3.1. While SLS was obliged to do so only
to the standards it deem[ed] necessary for Freight Rail Service,"
he contract required that the maintenance be performed "in a good
nd workman-like manner and in compliance with all applicable laws
id regulations."

Coordination Agreement at

3.3.

On or about February 19, 1998, George Goebel was severely
tjured when he fell from his bike at or near the crossing at 1700
uth near 200 West.

In January 1999 Mr. Goebel filed an action

ainst both UTA and SLS, as well as others, to collect damages
suiting from his injuries.

While the theory of the precise

strumentality which caused the accident perhaps changed over the
irse of the litigation, Mr. Goebel consistently maintained that
to these parties, UTA and SLS, it was the negligent state of the
ssing which caused his injury and it was the failure of these
ties to properly maintain the intersection.
:led with Mr. Goebel, but SLS did not.
>el suffered

a directed verdict
-5-

Ultimately, UTA

Factually, after trial

against him and defendant

herein, SLS, prevailed, as did Salt Lake City in that litigation.
UTA now seeks, under language in the contract, indemnification
for both the costs of the litigation and the amount of the
settlement,

SLS also seeks, under language in the contract,

indemnification for amounts it expended related to the litigation
in which it was successful.
This contract, which defines the rights and duties of the
parties in reference to each other, includes provisions designed to
establish which of these two parties is liable to a third party
injured due to the negligence of one or both of the parties.

The

Coordination Agreement requires of the party granted exclusive
access

to the right of way the maintenance of that right of way,

which by definition includes
1, definitions at page 5.

xx

all . . . crossings [.]" Id. Section

In essence this agreement provides that

the entity in control of a particular aspect of trackage was to be
the

entity

responsible

for maintaining

it.

Nothing

in the

Coordination Agreement reserves any duty of maintenance for Joint
trackage crossings during the period of time at issue to UTA. UTA
was not using the tracks in 1998 and SLS was.

Granted SLS had

limited use in terms of time and days, and UTA retained ownership
as well as substantial control in other ways, but the burden of
maintenance

fell upon

the party using

the

tracks

agreement and according to the intent of the parties.

-6-

under the

Section 3.3 of the Coordination Agreement, as cited above,
identifies the duty of maintenance, and although it indicates that
the duty requires nothing more than that SLS maintain the crossing
at the condition which it deems necessary for freight rail service,
and as it existed at the time of the execution of the contract
(which was cited as being "good"), by allowing SLS to determine
rhen maintenance is necessary, the duty contains a discretionary
lement. It still requires maintenance. Axiomatically, then, SLS's
xercise of discretion in maintaining, or neglecting, the 1700
Duth crossing necessarily carried with it certain inherent risks.
le parties' intent regarding the allocation of the burden of these
.sks, or in other words, the allocation of liability, is addressed
Section 7 of the contract:
When such Loss or Damage results from or
arises in connection with the maintenance,
construction, operations or other acts or
omissions of only one of the parties,
regardless of any third party involvement,
such Loss or Damage shall be borne by that
party.
at 7.2(a).

In other words, nowhere in the agreement does UTA

e itself a guarantor of SLS's exercise of discretion in the
ner of maintenance or repair of the joint trackage during the
Lod from the execution of the contract in 1993 to the time of
accident in 1998. UTA did not retain an oversight function of
responsibilities for maintenance. In fact, as the contract
-7-

further provides:
Each party agrees that it will pay for all
Loss or Damage the risk of which it has herein
assumed, the judgment of any court to the
contrary
and
otherwise
applicable
law
regarding liability notwithstanding, and will
forever indemnify, protect, defend and hold
harmless the other party, its successors and
assigns, from such payment.
Id. , at 7.3.
reflects

SLS does not contest that this language correctly

the

intent

of

the

parties

on

the

matter

of

indemnification, indeed, SLS' argument in its motion requires it.
Where the parties interpretations differ is upon the language in
the contract regarding modification.
However, the definition of modification used in the contract
did not include alteration of the crossing.

The limitations placed

upon SLS's modification of the trackage included only "alterations
or additions

to, or removal of, then-existing

trackage

on the

Right-of-Way," which the definition further clarifies as "including
but

not

limited

to

new

connections,

and

changes

in

communication systems, signal or dispatching facilities."

railroad
Even if

remedying the alleged (by Goebel) negligent state of the crossinc
required

"modification,"

provisions

regarding

the

as

with

the

modification

discretion:

-8-

maintenance
inject

an

duty,

the

element

o

If
SLS
reasonably
determines
that
Modifications are required to accommodate its
Freight Rail Service over the . . . Joint
trackage, SLS shall bear all expenses in
connection with such modification.
Id. / at 4.1.

While SLS was required to obtain UTA approval and

enter into a separate modification agreement prior to commencing
construction

on

the modifications,

and

thus UTA

retained

the

.mplicit right to exert some control over modifications, the only
ray in which UTA's duty would be triggered is if it denied SLS's
equest to modify, or refused to negotiate with SLS regarding the
odification.

Not

only

were

UTA's

obligations

related

to

edification not triggered by SLS's request to modify, the parties
ive presented no evidence that UTA conducted itself in a manner
ich would implicate this duty.

CONCLUSION
The Agreement, complex as it is, and even though it contains
le ambiguities, seems to present an intent of the parties that
user of the railroad, the tracks, is the one responsible for
ntaining

them.

lionizing

all

:ies

as

is

Reading

provisions
stated

the

agreement

as

where

possible,

the

in the preceeding

a

whole,

intent

sentence.

The

and

of

the

court

eves, from an examination of the Goebel complaints, that his
gations were a failure of maintenance in essence against these
-9-

parties.

Because

UTA's

loss

resulted

from

the

maintenance,

construction, operations or other acts or omissions of SLS, because
the section of track where the accident occurred was

within SLS's

control at the time, the Coordination Agreement requires that SLS
indemnify UTA for its payment of that obligation.
The court does not agree that because both parties may have
had, under the agreement, some obligation of maintenance at various
times, that UTA is not entitled to indemnification. The agreement,
at 7.3, discusses that the parties will pay for all loss for which
it has assumed the risk.

To the extent 3.3 of the Agreement is

ambiguous, and the court believes it is not and is ruling that the
language

of

the

agreement

dictates

this

result,

if

there

is

ambiguity other portions of the contract, as well as the course of
conduct of the parties before, shows the intent of the parties
throughout
intent

this

was,

period

again,

before passenger

that

the

user

be

traffic

existed.

responsible

for

That
the

maintenance, and that included the crossings and included the duty
of not only maintaining the rails so freight traffic would be safe,
but so that at least the "present condition" would be maintainec
and the tracks would be in a good condition in compliance "with al]
applicable laws and regulations." Agreement at 3.3.
The

law

requires,

under

this

contract,

regardless of the negligence of the other.

-10-

indemnificatio

Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED,

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and
order is required-

DATED this L^_

day of/ L• LCJL'/ ^ 4^2005

71
BRUCE C. LUBECK
District Court Judge

-11-

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 030906885 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated t h i s

Ji

day of

/YterZ/ZCt

NAME
CASEY K MCGARVEY
ATTORNEY DEF
50 S MAIN ST STE 1250
NORTH SALT LAKE, UT 84144
TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
ATTORNEY PLA
GATEWAY TOWER W
15 W S TEMPLE STE 1200
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
ALAN L SULLIVAN
ATTORNEY PLA
GATEWAY TOWER WEST
15 W S TEMPLE STE 1200
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101

\0OS

Deputy Court Clerk

3rtQ

i

(last)

TabC

Prepared and Submitted by:

FILED DISTRICT COURT

Alan L.Sullivan (3152)
Todd Shaughnessy (6651)
Snell & Wilmer L L P
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Jalt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
telephone: (801)257-1900
acsimile: (801)257-1800

Third Judicial District

MAR } 0 2005
SALT LAKE Q£fNTY
By.

Deputy Cterk

.ttorneys for Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant
tah Transit Authority

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
AJf TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Utah
)lic transit district,

DATE

Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,

JUDGMENT

Case No. 030906885

.T LAKE CITY SOUTHERN
LROAD COMPANY, INC., a Delaware
oration,

Judge Bruce C. Lubeck

Defendant and
Counterclaimant.
030906885

JD16886318
SALT LAKE CITY SOUTHERN RAILRO,

This matter came before the Court, Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding, on crossns for summary judgment. The issues having been fully briefed, and the Court having
d a Ruling and Order dated March 2, 2005, granting Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant
Transit Authority's ("UTA's") motion for summary judgment, and denying Defendant and

\SLC\340221

Counterclaimant Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company Inc.'s ("SLCS's") motion for
summary judgment, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

SLCS's Counterclaim against UTA is hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the

merits, and SLCS shall take nothing thereby;
2.

UTA is hereby awarded a judgment of damages in the principal sum of

$238,190.69, plus interest at the rate of rate often percent (10%) per annum, as provided by Utah
Code Ann. § 15-1-1, for the period from September 19, 2002, through the date of entry of this
Judgment;
3.

This Judgment shall bear interest from and after the date of entry at the rate

specified in Utah Code Ann. § 15-l-4(3)(a); and
4.

Pursuant to the terms of Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, UTA is

hereby awarded its costs of court against SLCS.
DATED t h i s / / , / ' day of March, 2005.
BY THE COURT

.
J^L-

LS

Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck
Third District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY:
BERMAN& SAVAGE

E. Scott SafVage
Casey K. McGarvey
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant
Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc.

i

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

of March 2005,1 caused a true and correct copy of the

foregoing to be hand delivered to the following
E. Scott Savage
Casey K. McGarvey
BERMAN & SAVAGE
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

^iWv^'^v-

r\SLC\34022t
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EXHIBIT "D"
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:
Ken Ocken
Union Pacific Railroad Company
Law Department - Rddm 830
1416 Dodge Street
Omaha, NE 68179

TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT
LIBRARY COPY
DIVISION,
TITLE.

UPn«

do*/

RETAINED FREIGHT OPERATING EASEMENT
RETAINED FREIGHT OPERATING EASEMENT ("Freight Easement")
retained by the Union Pacific Railroad Company, a Utah
corporation (hereinafter referred to as "UP").

l.

RESERVATION QF FREIQRT EASEMENT
1.1

UP hereby reserves a rail freight easement for the

purpose of providing common carrier rail freight service to all
freight customers on the Right-Of-Way (as defined in Section
1.1(a) of the Purchase and Sale Agreement between UP and Utah
Transit Authority dated as of the 30th day of October, 1992).
The real property to which this Freight Easement relates is
described as:
UP»s freight railroad line located between Ninth Street
Junction, on the north side of NINTH (900) SOUTH
STREET, Salt Lake City, Utah (approximately milepost
798.74) and the Salt Lake County/Utah County boundary
line (approximately milepost 775.19) consisting of
approximately
23.55 miles, as shown on the UP's Chief
Engineerfs Alignment Maps of the Union Pacific Provo
Subdivision Line and as shown on the Oregon Shortline
Railroad Station Maps - Lands aka Property Accounting
Valuation Maps;
UP's spur freight railroad line which departs in a
southwesterly direction from the Provo Subdivision Line
at approximately 6400 South in Murray, Utah
(approximately milepost 790.52) crossing under both the
1-15 freeway and the D&RGW Railroad main line, and then

en

cr;

heading south to approximately 7400 South, to the point
of intersection with the D&RGW right of way
(approximately milepost 1,402), a distance of about 1.4
miles, as shown on the UP's Chief Engineer's Alignment
Maps of the Union Pacific Provo Subdivision Line and as
shown on the Oregon Shortline Railroad Station Maps Lands aka Property Accounting Valuation Maps.
That portion of the Property sold by Seller to UTA located
in the center of historic Sandy (Old Town) which extends
from approximately 8600 South to 9000 South along the UPRR
Right-Of-Way and running from approximately 150 East to 190
East; the east-west width of this property is approximately
260 feet, more or less, with the exception of a small
portion on the north end which is narrower, and its length
from north to south is approximately 2560 feet;
That portion of the Property sold by Seller to UTA situated
between 5410 and 5830 South Streets at 300 West and which is
approximately 2500 feet long and 125 feet wide;
BUT LESS AND EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE PARCELS OF PROPERTY
DESCRIBED IN EXHIBIT "A" HERETO AS TO WHICH NO FREIGHT
EASEMENT IS RESERVED.
1.2

This Freight Easement shall be for common carrier rail

freight service on the Right-Of-Way and by this Freight Easement
UP reserves the exclusive right to conduct freight railroad
operations on the Right-Of-Way, but this Freight Easement shall
not be construed to prohibit or limit other non-freight uses by
other parties.

Said easement includes the right to operate with

UP's trains, locomotives, rail cars and rail equipment with UP's
own crews over the Right-Of-Way for the purposes the set forth in
this Freight Easement; provided, however, that said right to
operate trains, locomotives, rail cars and rail equipment over
the Right-Of-Way shall be an exclusive right to the occupancy and
use of the Right-Of-Way only with respect to rail freight
operations and UP acknowledges and agrees that Utah Transit
3/29/93 Easexnnt3.ret

-

2 -

Authority (nUTAw) or its designee shall have the right to the
occupancy and use of the Right-Of-Way for Passenger Operations
and all other uses.
1.3

The reservation of this Freight Easement by UP includes

a reservation of any and all rights and obligations of UP under
federal law to provide common carrier rail freight service to
freight customers along the Right-Of-Way.
1.4

The reservation of this Freight Easement includes

reservation of a right of entry over the Right-Of-Way for any and
all UP employees, agents or representatives, machinery, vehicles
or equipment which UP reasonably may deem necessary or convenient
for the purposes of inspecting the Right-Of-Way, clearing any
derailments or wrecks of UP trains on the Right-Of-Way or
otherwise conducting UP rail freight service over the Right-OfWay in accordance with this Freight Easement.
1.5

This Freight Easement is subject to the terms,

conditions and limitations set forth in the Purchase Agreement
between UTA and UP.

2.

TERM AND TERMINATION
This Freight Easement shall terminate and be extinguished

and all real property rights and other rights reserved to UP
lereunder shall vest in the owner of the Right-Of-Way in the
ivent of termination, pursuant to an order of the Interstate
rommerce Commission (I.C.C.), of common carrier rail freight
ervice on the Right-Of-Way or any part thereof; provided,
'29/93 Easemnt3.ret
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however, that a termination of this Freight Easement pursuant to
such an order shall apply only to those sections of the Right-OfWay subject to such I.C.C. order. The termination provisions of
this Section 2 shall not apply to a termination of rail freight
service by UP done as part of a transfer of its common carrier
freight rights and obligations to a successor or assign.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this
Retained Freight Operating Easement to be executed as a sealed
instrument by their duly authorized representatives as of the
31st day of March, 1993.
Attests
/
/

X ' #

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
/

Jii^l/
cu $AiU££

BY *?<%&/*„&
(Print Name)

(Print Name)

Title

Assistant Secretary

£t£cv+t'e-

/c\S£/S+«"r

Acknowledged:
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY:
By.

STATE OF NEBRASKA
COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

rJohn Cv>»ingree
General Manager

)

)

SS:

)

On the
day of March/ 1993, personally appeared before
me
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he,
is the Assistant
the said
Secretary of Union Pacific Railroad Company, and that he, the rc*
"
A." /f.' "s<z.s/ot<^T2.
i s t h e jS^c 4S$r.
said
__,__ 7^ *f
of Union Pacific Railroad Company, and that the within and
foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by
authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors and said
3/29/93 Easemnt3.ret
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C c CO. $/hVLOC£
/.. p. So/A^u^r 2~ each
and
duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same
and that the seal affixed is the seal of 9^id corporation.
Xfck^t^

My Commission Expires;

NOTARY

MJ$7 ^
STATE OF UTAH

J

tyA^^^-^^C

PUBLIC

EE«AlinTAHY-St2(»ff
RUfHA HOWARD

t Coram Eip. Nov. i 1091

)
)

SS:

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
1993, personally appeared
On the /TT day of
before me Joan Burns ide find John C. Pingree who being by me duly
sworn did say, each for herself /himself, that she, the said Joan
Burnside is the President, and he, the said John C. Pingree is
the General Manager of the Utah Transit Authority, and that the
within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of Utah
Transit Authority by authority of a resolution of its Board of
Directors and said Joan Burnside and John C. Pingree each duly
acknowledged to me that Utah Transit Authority executed the same
and that the seal affixed is the seal/of Utah Transit Authority•
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires
r/";jst£80Sou?t2£3> I
Sdi Late City, Utah 84101!
AfyCommiuiDn Expires I
oft**

19/93 Easemnt3,ret
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EXHIBIT "A"

I S
of « - f i - - J S : M - f c S K S r S S S T Suthea
quarter of S e c t K r t i ( « ) . Township Two (2) South Range £ . ( 1 )
- \ West, Salt Lake Meridian, and more fully described as follows, tonrflt.

^ 7 S r c e n J e r ' o K a t r s e ^ l o n . said 'point being fifty W««£?J£

^
3

H

aKM?(S&?«; K

9

,

U l -s Jv S ^n S Sn^h-sl^-n,

(0°30West. eight hundred sixty-two and ® f^J^^ 'J*f """ / fl qo 30 .\ M e s t oi
L 7 &
North e1gbty-n1ne J^^fSExSTy?™™*~»"—
hundred (100) feet to ^ P ° ^ " ^ ^ ^ ^ l l r o S / t h e n c e North no
line of main track £ j * « " J H ^ . t \ t s t two hundred thirty-three and
S K ^ l S * S S d S w L r S s & f « to the place of beginning.

A strip of land 100 feet wld,u 1;.theNortheast1/4 of Jectlon 1 3 . « .
" • " • J ^ S r t F S w a ^ h e ^ o n ' s h o r t line Railroad Company. Sa,d st,
C ^ g l r l T e r t l c u l U described as follows:

V

Beginning at a point 1854 feet
» ™ - • ' • » ^ l ^ \ l i T ^ ^
l e l s . Soith of the Northeast corner of said Section i . n
5 0 f M t fn
the East right of way line of the Oregon ?" "southwest corner of the
the center line of Its main Une. and at the S°™ we j£
S o u t h 0"30' W.
Serican Smelting and ™ « J * " m ^ ^ £ * U E. along th.
parallel to said center line ™>l.B™»'•^!%hence North 0"30E., para
South side of John Berger's ^ • ^ - J / ^ e g o n Short Line main Une, 1<
^ t i S c T S r y S J l . ' S S S fee? S STplace of beginning.
TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT
LIBRARY COPY

(Exhibit »A» continued)

£)> rne following described lanrf /.ia,-_ ^
* * * of the Southeast Swrter 5 thi 2 ^ J ° "* t ;

Part o f

tot three (3) ,„w

^ , Beginning eight 5/10 (8 5/10) mrf* c ^ ^

though t S S S P ^ V * t h e

land

"^<"an.

iying b e t w e e n „,

*«» 4 9 , and 62, sandy S t a t i o n P l a t .

^

iding

trat

.
* situated i n

cr.

TabE

ADHINISTEATION AND COORDINATION AGREEHEOT

TMs

ADMNISTRATION

" C o o r d i n a t i o n Agreement-,

AND

COORMNAriON

i s made a s o f

tte

3 1 s t

1 9 9 3 , b e t w e e n S a l t Lake c i t y S o u t h e r n R a i l e d
corporate
d-trxct

f a s . ,

and

Dtah

^

^

^

Co

a

. Part

, „
-,

xnc

10

( t h

^

day

•'
^ ^

^

o r g a n i z e d under T i t l e X7A, c h a p t e r

AGREZHZNT

.

^
a Texas
^ ^

Utah code

A n n o t a t e d 1 9 5 3 , a s amended ("UTA").

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, pursuant t o t h e P u r c h a s e and S a l - Acrreemen- K <•
— Agreement between
rnion P a c i f i c Railroad ComDany ("UDRR.M a T ^

- 3 K u.wt j ana OTA, dated as o^
otober 30, 1992 (the "Purchase Agreement") j ™ , ha<?
J/ U^KR bas conveyed to
»

as of the date of this Coordination Agreement certain ^ight-of-

VI. trackage and other assets and improvements located on
~ v o subdivision Line, and on

OTER.S

Lovendah,

^

^

^

mst.m

^

» «idvale Lead, (more fully described and defined belov as the
ught-of-way.) excluding a freight railroad operating
.
operating easement
ich was retained by DPRR;
WHEREAS, pursuant to a freight railroad ooera-i™
operating easement and
assignment agreement between DPRR an d S r s ria+. ^
a SLS
' dated as of Karch 31,
'3 (the "Easement Agreement"), DPRR h = <= ~
) , UPRR has conveyed to SLS as of the
•e of this Coordination Agreement a fre^ob- ™n
-ire^gn^ railroad ooerating
eaent
n to
°
« Rigbt-of-Way ( d e r i nea b e ej,QW
'
lov
as
the "Freight
ement") i n o r d e r t o e n a b l e S L S
±
1 M
^
common carrier rail
i-ght operations on the Right-of-w r

WHEREAS, the parties hereto (DTA and SLS) will be sharing
usage of the Right-of-Way under terms and conditions set forth
below; and

WHEREAS, the parties desire to clarify and establish their
respective rights and obligations with respect to SLSfs common
carrier rail freight operations on the Right-of-Way and DTAfs
construction of additional trackage and provision of passenger
seirvice on the Right-of-Way*

NOW,

THEREFORE,

in

consideration

of

the

premises,

reservations, covenants and undertakings contained herein, SLS and
UTA covenant and agree as follows:

SECTION 1.

DEFINITIONS

The following terms and phrases shall be defined as follows
for the purposes of this Coordination Agreement:

"Closing Date" shall have the meaning ascribed in the Purchase
Agreement, which is the date the sale of assets from UPRR to DTA is
closed and which closing is to take place, if practical by December
31, 1992, but not later than June 1, 1993,

"Coordination Agreement" shall mean this Administration and
Coordination Agreement.

UTA002C

"Easement Agreement" shall mean that certain iv • „
c P « a t i n g easement „ d ttfi a s s i g i m e n t
~«
*«** ««*«

<*** a n a « ,

height

M d dated

„

of

Easement„ E h a i l

^

3i_

M a n

^

' *

^ ^Msement

« - b * ^

^

C o m m o n c;*r-T-T<*>- ~ --r ^

~ - ^ c u . jjy v,!^ f o r

on earner raxl frexght operation an the v±ah+ +
to the terms af +h ,
*^at-of- H a y
«ie terms of the Easement Agreement.

"Freight Preference Period" shall have the
A c t i o n 5.4 hereof.

fflea

^

piIrsuant

^

aSCrib

* d *"

"Freight Hail Service" shall mean the common carrier

-,

h e i g h t operations to he conducted by SLS on th
7 S L S <a the Right-of-tfay.
"Freight Trackage" shall mean any J o i n t
^
assenger Trackac
„„ • . •
Trackage and/or
* r Trackage, vhxch xs designated by TO * f l „
- e k a g e pursuant to Section 2.3 hereof 0
^
^
r
cistin^ *
u
'
^
Editions to the
c^tzng trackage constructed by SLS on the RiaHt .
• ° S 1 " 5 ° " e « « » « * . to section 4. x hereof.

*tSr

^

tta

"Joint Trackage" shall mean the t r a c w „ . . .
aCtaSe
-Bay a s o f t h . „,
.
« f " ^ to the HichtV as of the closing Date that was include •
• — » * , «escrihe d in B.hiMt *A»
lesi„at *
l ^ g n a t e d pursuant to Section

h e r e t

a

.

3

"ded " t h e ******
' ™ i e S S SU<* Package i s
he.eQf

—
d a n g e r Trackage . s i g ^
ckage pursuant- +•« c ^ . y« pursuant to Section 2.3 hereof.

b y

' J

^

^
b e

J o u i t

TTTAnnoi

n m s t s l i a b i l i t i e s , judgments,
-it chalT mean a l l c o s t s , ±J.<^~>
w-r,nss or Damage" snai- «<=

—

ac
^

*

J

°

i n t
p

^l

tte

of«">
way o

«i 9 ht-of-^, - —

" r * : " " — « -— - * ^-" "
• •„« rise to a claim for Loss or Damageomission giving rise x.o
™mt" shall mean a written agreement
"Modification Agreement
shax
^ i e s hereto entered into in anticipation of
between the parties herer
Modification.
.,.
. t a . o r -Hodifications" — 1 1 — » - l ^ t i o n S ° r
"Modification or a
Ricrixt. .
or
removal
of,
then-existing
tradcage
on
the
» ,
t o
a d d l t l O M
o f

.Hay,

in

" '
h t M t l i n i t
i n c l u d e hut not U»

railroad

cOBmuhicatxon

e d

to new connections, and changes
^
^
^

systems,

facilities.

. . ^ s e n g e r Preference —

-

"

—

" "^

n i n 9

a S C r l W

in Section 5.4 hereof.
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- - — « .

en

a l I o r M y p o r t i o n

o f

^

^

^

v M c h

*e provxded by OTA or i t s designee.

"Passenger Trackage" shall

~

^

^

h e r e a f t e r

mean a l l
ail

d e s i g n a t a d

s y

^

t o

«„
segments

of

tracks ~a

^

h e

pursuant to Section 2.3 hereof.

"Purchase Agreement" shall mean that CP
rf 9 • „.
c
^
^rtaxn Purchase and Sale
agreement by and between UTA and U?R* da*-.*
a s
' d^ed
of October 30,
9S2^

"Riglat-of-Way« shall mean the f oliovina adees cs c r i b e
• •
r i b e d portions of
p r o p e r t y i u ^ t , c m v e y e d by W S R t Q ^
^
p _ ^ t ^
-™

«-

•acicage,

conation, o,

tte

a

s t r u c t u r e s

^

s

a Agraefflant:

a i i

ad

,acetf. t
J
^cenu ^

r i g h t

.of.fc

^
the Drooe^ty
s=rlbed i n P a r c e l s No. , M d a o t
"
A
_
to the Purchase
r e c e n t , including all r e a i p r o p e r t y
.
y saown
^ d described in the
?s and other documents regarding the riaht „r
, .
igiit-of-vay which were
Mll,
-luded xn Exhibit "A" to the Purchase *
-rurcnase Agreement, and a l l
*ures, t r a c k S / r a i l S /
t i e s >
r.^
+.
' cross^gs,
tunnels,
dges, t r e s t l e s , culverts, buildincs
struck
,
" ' s^ructures, f a c i l i t i e s ,
«s,
turnouts, t a i l s , sidincs
* M «.
s p u r S /
gS/
team
,_
.
tracks, s i g n a l s ,
s s i n f T n
s s m g protection devices, railroad communication
^icatxons systems, poles
a l l other operating appurtenances that are sitna* „ ,
e
sxtuated: (i) on or
M d

^

^

d

.

rt

-„ the trackage formerly constituting P=* -

"
l
i
e
from « - ^
" * * ~°*"™"
Subdivision
Line
• 4-0iv UPRR milepos-t 775.xaj

iin aepro

u

"^

" » "

^^ "J a n ^
c t

also

trackage

i o^
n

in sait

rt - - - - <—> -*" •—

(which is on the *
l a t e l y U K » milepost 798.74}, an

spur,

»""

Known
referenced

^
above

soatto,esterly

o n Q r

v

direction at
^
_

• , t e l v 6400 (SIXTY-FOCR EDNDE2D) South Stree
approximately
79 O.S2), crossing under

!d

- - - zrz - ~—- ——' /itnx/QCTPM mam line, ana. uxx
(
. . o f intersection with t h e DOS* r i g h t ox way, a
South, t o t h e point of inter
distance of approximately 1-4 Biles.

a

< i - LaXe City Southern Railroad Co., I n c . ,
»SU5" s h a l l mean Salt LaXe Ci y
„ the Freight Railroad Successor unaer the
Texas corporation and the Freig

Purchase Agreement.
a public
u t a h Transit Authority,
shall meaa Utah Tr
• ^ under Title 17A, Chapter 2, Pa-w m ,
d i s t r i c t organized undea n H i t s successors or assigns.
Annotated 1953, and i t s su
.OTX-

transit
^

SECTION 2 .
.
the terms « - conditions of the Easement
2 . 1 w « « n t to the t e .
o b l i c a t i o n to
shall
have
the
exclusive
r
i
g
h
t
and
f
SLS
Agreement, SLS sn
UTA002'

provide Freight Rail Service on the Freight Trackage and the Joint
Trackage.

SLS shall have no right or obligation to conduct, and

shall not conduct, directly or indirectly, Freight Rail Service on
the Passenger Trackage or any other activity whatsoever on the
Right-of-way that is not necessary to Freight Rail Service. U T A
shall have no right or obligation to conduct, and shall not
conduct, directly or indirectly, Freight Rail Service on the Rightof-Way.

2.2

UTA shall have the exclusive right to conduct, by

itself or through UTA's designee or otherwise, Passenger Service on
:he Right-of-way.

SLS shall have no right or obligation to

:onduct, and shall not conduct, directly or indirectly, Passenger
ervice on the Right-of-Way; provided, however, that UTA and SLS
ay arrange, under a separate written agreement, for SLS to perform
ertain services on behalf of DTA with respect to the Passenger
srvice.

2.3

DTA may from time to time, upon 30 days written notice to

^S, change any track designation (Freight Trackage, Passenger
•ackage or Joint Trackage) to any other track designation;
ovideo, however that no such change in track designation shall
reasonably interfere with SLS's Freight Rail Service on the
ght-of-Way; provided, further, that the parties may agree to
mediate track redesignations to respond to emergencies or the
eds of the parties.

DTA may not designate trackage as Freight

*ckage without the written consent of SLS if such trackage is (1)

„
being used

toen

faT

„ r ,21 then not being used
passenger Service, or (2)
^ ^
^ ^ ^
^
e c o n o B i C a l ana

tor

Freight Bail Service.
^ ^
^ ^
^ . ^
* *,->- -pail Service ana r<=.
^ ^ c o o r d i n a t i o n C c ^ t t e e . The
r e l i a b l e Freight Bal
—
^
^
^
U
coordination «
—
«"

i

convene to resoive those administrative
^
f„
c o o r d i n a tion committee

coordination matt

^

r e g i o n by the ter^s ^
^

ot her

-

matters, upon agr

^

^

^ ^

^

^

Agree ,ent

^

as veil

-

^

^

^

^

£ r o B e a ch

party.

Committee s h a U - = - J£ S L S ^ OTA
The chief executive office.
of the coordination Committee.
officio members 01

also shaU

^

be

«

SECTION 3 .
onsible for t h e maintenance, repair and

-

^

"

^ r r t a n ^ t

d e e . necessary for

rene«

t h e same t o «*. „ ^ tvH^-fc
SLS s h a l l / at * *"S e r v i c e ; provided
h a t SIS

condition

of

tracK

*

^

. e s c r i b e d on Z * » x t
e x p e n s e s

—

"JCT-

of
"

^

maintenance
^

^

.

^
d

- ~—-

^

M i n t a i n

^

^

_

^
^

. e i g h t h

^

^

,f
^

^

,

repair
p r - m e

costs

^
^

and

Freight

^

„

r e n e . 1 on the . e i g h t Trackage in

UTA0026

3-2
renewal
r£

"e"

tte

OTA shall be responsible for the maintenance, ^

o f

tta

" "

P a s S enger
t 0

Trackage

«t»

^

t e

*'

M d
d

"

s h a l l

—

M i n t a

.n_

— a r y

^

^

^

f o r

^
P a s s e n g e

,

S e r v i c e ; DTA shall bear a l l costs and expenses of
•
« p e n s e s of maintenance,
repair and renewal of the Passenger Trackage.

3.3

subject

to

sections

3.4

and

1 0

.2,

SLS

s h a n

he

r e s p o n s i v e for and shall pay the costs of the maintenance, repair
and renewal of the

Joint

Trackage a,d shall maintain, repair and

renew the same to the standards i t deems necessarv *
r- •
necessary for Freicht Rail
Service; provided that SLS shall, at a mini™1T„
• * - a minimum, maintain, reoair
and

renew

condition

the
of

Joint

track,

Trackage

so

as

grade crossings

to

preserve

and signal

the

present

facilities

as

Ascribed on Exhibit -B- hereto. N o t hing herein shall r e i i e v j SLS
af the obligation to perform maintenance, reoair- *„,,
«-e, repair and renewal on the
Toint Trackage in a good and workman-like M n n o r
, •
XXK& m a n n e r
and m compliance
r
ith a l l applicable laws and regulations.
3.4
"cty

Upon written notice to SLS at *™ *.•
^
at any time, but at l e a s t
(60) days prior to commencement of P a « Q
or Passenger Service, DT\

- 1 1 undertake and assume a l l costs of maintenance, reoair and
— I

of the Joint Trackage.

Dpon

assumption of

main^ce,

:palr

a n d

P«r

and renew the Joint Trackage to the standards i t

«"«<«1 of the Joint Trackaoe
s=,

nr» «„,•.,
•
•
UTA shall maintain,
deems

cessary for Passenger Service; provided that OTA shall, a t a
nxmum, maintain, repair and renew the Joint T M = ! „
""-""- Trackage so as to
sserve the track to FHA Class I track
.rack an*
and grade crossings and

signal

facilities

l o d g e s
^

iJ L

to their then « * - *

that « -

*

U s^icient

—

condition.

' condition of

«.

hereby

track and signai

for i t s . e i g h t . a i l

Service.

Xf

«

.„ ^
renew the Joint Trackage in
maintain, repair and
„
with the s^dard set fort, above, W
shall have the
accordance with th
^
^
^
^
^

*»ils

to

right

to maintain,

repair ana

s t a n d i - e s s a r v to fulfill

4

,

I f

S,S reasona.lv

if

~ i l carrier obligations.

-amines

that Modifications

are

* ^ i t s Freight Rail Service over the Freight
reouired to accommodate i t s rreig
„ ^
^ts shall bear a l l expenses in
«r- the Joint Trackage, SLS snaii

r e p a i r i n g , inspecting, ana
^

c^ice
associated with Passenger Service.
^
_ _
_
^
_
_

.creased o ^ g
e- c chall not commence caua<-~u
SJJS s n a i i 1^*,
Freight
. . -•„„<= to the Joint Trackage or v.he txexy
with such Modifications to tne
• „ i n t o a Modification Agreement vita tTCA
Trackage without entering xnto a M
rnn».< written consent. The parties shall, tar and obtaining UTA's written
•
mmrnittee negotiate in good faith to enter
t h e Coordination Committee, n
*. *«T- q t s ' s Modifications to tne
a Modification Agreement for SLS
or the Freicht Trackage necessary for Freigh

a n y

^ ^ ^
H e over the Kight-of-way.
Passenger Service

Xll Modifications made by
TTTAnfY?

SLS to the Freight T r a ^ e or the J o i n t ^

^

^ . ^ ^

^

of-Way shall become the property of OTA.

4-2 OTA plans to construct additional trackage (which, in the
absence of some other designation, shall initially he deemed to he
Passenger Trackage) on the Right-of-Way s o that
^
2 ° ^nat, through usaae of
existing and such additional trackacre
^
,• ,
age
' t h e RJ-ght-of-Way m a y
a c c o s t s Freight ^ n s a r v i c e ^ p a s s e n g e r s a r v i c a _ ^
^ ;
— e

the right to construct such additional trackage as

it

dea

J

necessary; provided, however, that no <™^
no such construction shaU
unreasonably interfere with SLS's Freight ^ U s _ •
yilt
« a n Service on the
Right-of-way but that SLS shall reasonablv ,-„
asonably cooperate with OTA so as
to allow for the construction of additional t r a c k s
^
•
"ZJ. trackage on the Riahtof-way. OTA and SLS, through the Coordination n
•
<^raination Committee, shaU
cooperate to secure (from a third n„w-v • „
a third party independent contractor)
temporary substitute service during c o n ^ ^ ^xng cons auction or modification
periods; the cost of substitute service to freiah*
*
t o rre
ignt customers during
instruction or modification periods s h a U n o t . .
— L not: «« borne by SLS.
TA shall be responsible for the cons*™,-. •
« e construction of additional
rackage for Passen'ger Service on the Pirrm- *
the Right-of-ffay and shaU
onstruct the same to the standards it deems n e
aeems necessary for
*ssenger Service; OTA shall bear all costs anrf
cos^s and exoanses of
instruction of such additional trackage.
«-3

o a shall have the right, upon 30 da y s

w i t t e n notice

^

3, to realign the Freight Trackage, the Passenger Trackage or the
- * Trackage on the ght-o -Wav provided, however, that no such

r e a l i g n m e n t s h a l l unreasonably i n t e r f e r e w i t , SLS-s f r e i g h t Kail
S e r v i c e but that: SIS s h a l l . reasonably cooperate with UTA so as to
a l l o w f o r such realignment.
A
^ ™ i n e s t hwa t^ H o d i f i c a t i o n s t o the Joint
determines
Passenger Trackage ( a f t e r construction) are
Trackage or
Passeng
_
^ d a t e <ts Passenger S e r v i c e over the Joint
r e o u i r e d t o accommodate
^s
+** Passenger Trackage, UTA s h a l l bear a l l expenses in
Trackage or t h e Passenger x
4^nrfcion of a d d i t i o n a l , b e t t e r e d , or a l t e r e d
c o n n e c t i o n with construction or
• -, AAM without l i m i t a t i o n t h e annual expense (for so
f a c i l i t i e s , including without XJJU
4 4

l o n g
of

If

a s such a d d i t i o n a l , b e t t e r e d , or a l t e r e d f a c i l i t i e s are a part

t h e J o i n t Trackage or the Passenger Trackage) of maintaining,

rehiring,
f

UTA
fh«
the

inspecting,

acilities.

and renewing such a d d i t i o n a l

or a l t e r e d

A l l additions, a l t e r a t i o n s and improvements made by

.
n t Trackage or t h e Passenger Trackage s h a l l become
UTA t o t h e JT of i n t Trackage
• t h e p r o p e r t y of UTA.
, A- „ o-niv (i) construction under S e c t i o n 4-2 and 4.3
4 5 Excluding only ( i ; ^-w^*-1.ereof",
Trackage

(ii,

ordinary maintenance and r e p a i r work on the Joint

( i f UTA i s 'maintaining t h e J o i n t Trackage pursuant to

S e c t i o n 3 . 4 ) and ( i l l ) emergency work reguired for immediate
r e a s o n s , UTA s h a l l notify SLS i n writing of any proposed work on
and s h a l l submit plans on any Modifications
t h e J o i n t Trackage and s h a l l sue
*H n*rties through t h e Coordination Committee, sha.
thereto.
The p a r t i e s , w - *
• « « * ! f a i t h to ensure that such Modifications do n o .
c o o o e r a t e m good f a i t n to
™sona

b l

y i n — ™ - i t * or inpeae n * ^

w-of-«ay.

^

««vl«

a~r
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SECTION 5 .

5.1

QVMATIOES

UTA shall have exclusive authority to „

«»*.

«*•«*,

locatives.
soeed of
.—» of
anv riri,f
any r.ght

r a i l

c

^ j

t o control
_

^

• »u-a

^

r a a

e mov
«,.
=ent and
the «
a s *h , ,
o n the Passenger Trackage,
*
shall not have
to operate on the Passenger T r a c J c a g ^

5.2 SLS shall have exclusive authority to m,n
control a l l r a i i m ^
„
•
***' d i r e c t
^
a l l raxlroad and railroad-related ooeraMon
Trackage. SLS s h a n H
°P«-xons on the Freight
?e.
«

-X

~

~

SLS shall have exclusive authority to „ *

-ins,
-

W

i

,

.

speed of the «

railcars J
on the

F

^
r

e

™

i

o

» t have any right to operate on trac^
• " i g h t Trackage.
^

>•>

rail cars and rail ^

on the

J o i n t

d S S i

^

o f

^

Trackage without p r e j u d i c a

- h
a manner as v i l l r e s u , t
fici.ntficxent movement of all traffic.

"

L l " ^

^cept as set forth in Sections s.4-5 7

motives,
—ed

h

i

n

T
a

°

St

„,

£

~
^
-

™

,

.
<~-

'

" " '

"

^
^
^
^onomical and

5.4 in order to ensure safe econn™; ,
Service and *
—omxcal and reliable Freight
ervxce and Passenger Service, the M r f
a Freiqh. - „
^ P a r t i e s ^^eby establish
^rexgh. Preference Period for the R±ahi. *
Right
- ° f - » a y between the

hours of 12:00 midnight and 5:00 a.m., Monday through Friday,
inclusive, and (ii) a Passenger Preference Period for the Right-ofWay between the hours of 5:01 a.m. and 11:59 p.m., Monday through
Friday, inclusive, and all Saturday and Sunday. SLS has inspected
the Right -of-Way and reviewed the records of UPRR pertaining to
Freight

Rail

Service

on

the

Right-of-Way.

Based

on

such

investigation and review, SLS has determined that it can provide
Freight Rail Service within the above Freight Preference Period.'
SlaS agrees to employ such equipment and employees necessary to
provide Freight Rail Service within the above Freight Preference
Period.

The Coordination Committee shall, at either party's

request, meet to negotiate in good faith regarding proposed changes
to the Freight Preference Period and the Passenger Preference
Period.

5.5

During the Freight Preference Period, DTA shall not be

authorized to operate trains or conduct Passenger Service on the
Joint

Trackage

or the

Passenger

permission from the dispatcher.

Trackage,

without

special

During the Passenger Preference

Period, SLS shall not be authorized to operate trains or conduct
Freight Rail Service on the Joint Trackage or the Freight Trackage,
without special permission from the dispatcher.

5.6

During the Freight Preference Period, SLS shall manage,

direct and control, at SLSfs sole expense, all activities on the
Joint Trackage.
control

all

During such period, SLS shall manage, direct and

freight

railroad

and

freight

railroad-related

TTTAOm

o p e r a t i o n s on the Joint T r i a g e and s h a l i

direct

«,

c « * r o I t h . entry and e x i t „ , a l l ^
, " " * d i ™ « « «*
X train
,,,,
.,
s / locomotives r a i 7 „
«
- Z ^ i p « e n t and the n o v e m e n t ^ s p e e d
J J - - »
- ~ n t Trackage and the n , ^

S.,
* * *

Irac]cage_

Curing the Passenger P r e s e n c e

T rac*age.

«-*»! - I

During

sucb

^

"

Perlod

^

«* -

»-e

" /

^ " ""

a c t i v e , on the Joint ^

^

— c h i n g and controi the entry ^
locomotives, r a i l c a r s a n , r a i i
~

, OTA

«

on the Joint ^ a g e „

^
°

J
J

^
««

""
^
*»!»,

^
J
^
«
-assenger Trackage.

S ^ shall pay ali ta.es, assessments

f

.„ „

c —
- expenses reiated soieiy to F r a i c h t ^
^'.
^
Right-of-Wav «,~
Service on the
y ^ or way or ownership of the Freiah- -^
H I taxes ^
c e m e n t . DTA shall pay
•«• "caxes, assessments, fees, charges C a „
!
?
-lely t o Pas<;
' C ° S t 3 *** expenses related
£rfa o r
hereof. T h e -._.
,. ,
*
^
ownershiD
Tne parties shall negotiate in . ,
— — * .
—

- •

- r o e s , cost and a j j

or shared Use o f the H i g h t ^ 7

^

"

all0

" ""

"ta
^

'thin? in this Secti
" ^ h ° 1 ' a V e -'' « » t
th ls section =.3 shall be construed to re™ •
to
•y real »=-:..-»
.,
"quira SLS to
estate or ad valorem taxes; provided furrh
* " - — i o n 3.8 shall b ec o n s t r u e d t o ^ 7 * - - "
—
'
«"
rty.

—

« « »*«

t
a
x
e
sassessed
assess
T ^ the ^other "
against
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SECTION 6 -

Cii£AKi

Xf by reason of any mechanical failure or for any other

e l

« , . not resulting fro. an a c c e n t or d e r a i l , « y

*~in.

!•
rail car or rail eo^ipment of SLS becomes stalled or
^ m o t i v e , rail car
^ ^
^ ^
^
^
—

-

proceed under

^

^

^

SD eed

on the Right-of-Way or if,
„,» set out of a SLS train on the Right
otherwise defective cars are set on
™ tall have the option to furnish motive power or
~ U ~
^ ^
^
^
of _„ay, then «
or
S uch

other assistance as^ay

^

_

^

^v, ^ in locomotive, car or e^u v
such t rraa m , x«
. ^ ^irabursa
disabled eouip-ent off the Right-of-Way, and SLS sha- '
able and necessary cost of rendering any sucn
UTA for the reasonable and n
assistance.
,.a

SLS

the event of any derailment or ^
of a « . « ! . .
tte Right-of-way of all obstructions within
shall dear « - ^
^
^
^
^ _ , i n g
In

I
a c o r d L e with industry practices. Xn the event that
or wreck, m acco^ucu
^t-hin a
SLS

dees not clear the Right-of-Way of o b s t r u c t , ^

-

reasonable time, «

« * ~ the Right-of-Way o oos « c t
™ . <=„,- a n reasonable and necessary
SLS shall reimburse OTA for al.
incurred in performing such service.
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SECTION 7

„ . .

7 X

'
*** P m i -»U
overtake
* " " " ' '—»i. -ft. M d X o c a l ,

e i t t e r

*»**

P—ity. c

t0

« » P l y with s u c S l a «

p r 0 B p t l y M d in(Jemiify_

tte

P

0 t h e r

J"

2

="y ^

( i

^ ^

^eto

—
-

„ith

l i a M l i t y
tta

« -i-i™,

rties

a s

follows:

connection

v i t h tte

agrees

^ ^

- - U t ^
-

fcom

». " P o t i o n *
CTe

—

and

—

or

u

°*

^

rag^?

°th*™1"' " *
-

~

Baint

faiIUre

conply

*»«u .

p a r

,

" *"** — * ° " > a r a i e s s

^

at e i f c b e r

««.

, „

for

^

^

" ^

* - to

«".«« „ liaMlity b_d on ^J
««-

COBp1

*ay — i f in any fina,

such a ^ u n t .

»°f~thstanding

°

„ ,

orcharge ieing ass

r ^ , .

t

the
^ ^
other

Paid by the

or a r i s e s i n

—

acts or o n i o n s c , o n l y i n
^
°
— -1- wnxy one o"^ thA
« any ttira p a r t y ^ ^ ^
"
P « l « . regardless
borne by ttat p a r t y . ^
' C L o s s ° r Daaaje s h a l a b f i
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(b)

When such Loss or Damage results from or arises in

connection with the acts or omissions of both parties, or of
third parties, or from unknown causes, Acts of God, or any
other cause whatsoever, such liability shall be borne by the
party or parties responsible under applicable lav.

7,3

Each party agrees that it will pay for all Loss or Damage

the risk of which it has herein assumed, the judgment of any court
to the contrary and otherwise applicable law regarding liability
notwithstanding, and will forever indemnify, protect, defend and
hold harmless the other party, its successors and assigns, from
such payment.

7*4

In the event that both parties hereto shall be liable

under this Coordination Agreement for any claim, demand, suit or
cause of action, and the same shall be compromised and settled by
voluntary payment of money or valuable consideration by one of the
parties, release from liability will be taken in the name of both
parties and all of each partyfs officers, agents, and employeesNeither party shall *make any such compromise or settlement in
BX.C^SS

of $25,000 without prior, written authority of the other

party having liability, which consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld, but any settlement made by one party in consideration of
$25,000 or less shall be a settlement releasing all liability of
both parties and shall be binding upon both parties.
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7-5 m case a lawsuit or lawsuits shan ^

Ccc^ation
Vrt,

^

s

l

A g r

„ ,

y m l t U a

^

^

^

^

-««-

a n d s h a l l

b a v e

h a d r

««* - — * -

e

^

n

y
a

"

"

**> * « - « - .ttaa c j ti ~
,«orded,

udgttent.

^

p a r t y

s o

m

* » " * » - *>»

notice

•u * - o r DaMge in accordance

-

^

^ -

t y

-

* . ~

n o t i f i e d

9"-*ent

"

—

b a a n

- —• ~

h a s iaeiJ

be bound by such

7

- 6 Nothing i n , t h i s Section 7 shall >,
OTA o f anv *
•
construed as a waiver
f a n y
°
" « « n i t y # pursuant t o T*tl- fi- ^
m o t a t e d 195-,
*"
^ ^ ^ r 30, Utah Code
1353, as amended, or a p p l i e d s o as t o , •
n s t i t u t e such waiver.
efrectxvely
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SECTION 8 .

8.1

TERM; TERMINATION

This

C o o r d i n a t i o n Agreement

shall

terminate

upon

the

t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e F r e i g h t Easement.

8-2
relieve

Termination

of t h i s

Coordination

e i t h e r p a r t y of t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s

o t h e r p a r t y a r i s i n g p r i o r t o such

SECTION 9 .

lavs,

shall

or l i a b i l i t i e s

to

not
the

termination.

COMPLIANCE KITH LAWS

UTA and SLS s h a l l comply w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s of a l l

applicable

r e g u l a t i o n s , and r u l e s r e s p e c t i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n ,

condition,

inspection,
cars

Agreement

and

and s a f e t y

other

of t h e i r

respective

equipment o p e r a t e d

trains,

over t h e

locomotives,

Right-of-way.

Each

p a r t y s h a l l indemnify, p r o t e c t , d e f e n d and h o l d h a r m l e s s t h e o t h e r ,
its

affiliates,

and any of

its

directors,

officers,

e m p l o y e e s from and a g a i n s t a l l f i n e s , p e n a l t i e s ,

and

imposed

or

upon

directors,
and

the

other

officers,

regulations

jurisdiction,

by

party,

its

affiliates

agents

liabilities
any

a g e n t s , or employees u n d e r s u c h l a w s ,
any

public

authority

or

and

court

of

its
rules

having

when a t t r i b u t a b l e t o i t s f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h

the

p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s s e c t i o n -
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SECTION 1 0 .

CASUALTY

T^fc

10.1 In the event that any portion of uthe
Rich^ ,
a e
,-_ K .
-^gnt-af-Way that
« b e l n g used b y ^
£ o r ^
c o n t i n u £ d
p ^ v i ^
Service i s damaged or destroyed by

«».
•

pcrt.cn
«

^

ex the Mght-of-Kay
«" —

- - t r a c t i o n , or (
vi,-h
vxth property of

i i )

f I o o d

so

. .

t l M

damaged

or d

^

-

"

c - i t i - as existed pr7o r t
replace, or cause . „ „

li]ce

^

^

^

^

^

" ^ ^
~
replaced, such Dort<on
- »

- p e n s e or such repair or replacement shall" b h
" * * " *
snail be borne by DTA.
10.2
-

being

x„ the event that any portion or the Hight-of-Hay tha^
used b y S L S f o r tte c o n f c i n
V tha.

„
^
Provision of freight Hail
S « v i c # and «hich i s not also being used for » . ,
y ^ e a ror Passenger Service i<s
=-aged or destroyed by flood, f i r e , c i v i l
*"*"'
"
ais
•-rt^.
*_
«-urbance, earthouaJce
•-».
sabotage or act of Cod, or accidents or vandal*
Mrd parties or for which th
*««»aU« caused by
^ -Loir ^nicn the cause i<? T7r,^
U n t a o w n
i t h e r rii
' then, SLS may
S e r v i

^her

(i,

r e p a i r /

o r

c a u s e

t Q

^

fc
icrhi--o^ «
"
P o r ^ ° n of the
tght-of-way so damaged or destroved to s u b ^ . *
° s u b s t a n t i a i i y the same
3ndl>.
- d i t i o n as existed prior to such damaee o . destruc^.
' P ^ c e , or cause to be replaced, such D Q r t . •
Jce kind
. - •
P ° r t l o n with property of
kind, condition or quality.
T n e COst:
a n d
expense of such
M,-Pair or replacement shall be borne by SLS•
' » t s , provided, oovever.

„ n not be obligated under this Section 10.2 to repair
that SLS shall not fie ODX+V
or

reolace the daaaged or d e c o y e d portion of the *ight-of-Hay if

! » « « ' . good faith j u d ^ n t the cost thereof would he excessive or
_ e . s o n a . l e ta*ing into account the profitability of « - . freight
operations on the Hight-of-Way, unless ^

shall agree to r e m o r s e

SLS for such cost.

l0

3

Except when suhjeot to Section 7, in the event any

portion of the Kight-of-Way is damaged or destroyed hy accidents
..v, r^w-v or vandalism by the employees or agents of
caused by either party or vana
H the party that caused the accident or whose
either party, and the parry
„ p n t s c a U S e d the vandalism shall bear the cost and
employees or agents
causea tu
expense thereof.

SECTION 11.

11.1

COMPENSATE

Except as otherwise specifically

provided

in this

ant
S I c and UTA shall have no obligation to pay
Coordination Agreement, SLS ana
«*r-h other in connection with this
or otherwise compensate each othe.

Coordination Agreement*<,**<>
Any payments due and
+ «h*ll be
Coordination Agreement shall be
11.2

navabTe by SLS or OTA under this
payas.e cy
paid within forty-five (45) days
pax

int of an invoice therefor, by chec* delivered to the
after receipt of an inv«j.
- the oavee as set forth in Section 13.4 hereof; provided,
address of the payee as *
„
, .
that in the event of a good faith dispute relating to any
however, tnaL -m ^ ^
„t the d i e t e d portion of the invoice shall be paxd,
such p a r e n t , the
.
U T A 0 0 4

with full reservation of rights to possible reimbursement
resolution of such dispute. Any payments n o t ^

^

^

UDQn

^

^

(45, days of an invoice therefor shall thereafter be subject to
m e r e s t charges, which shall accrue at the highest lawful rate for
the forbearance of money.

11.3

upon request, a party disputing the accuracy of an,

invoice shall be entitled to receive fro* the billing p a r t y

mi„

of such supporting documentation and/or records as are tat in the
canary

course of the billing party-s business and which are

reasonably necessary to verify the accuracy of the invoice as
rendered.

SECTION 12.

INSURANCE

SLS, at its sole cost and expense shall
™
f «»«/ snail procure or cause to
ae procured and maintain or cause to h« * • ^ .
cause to be maintained during the
:cntinuance of this Coordination Agreement, railroad ooerating and
•rahility insurance covering liability assumed by SLS under this
oordination Agreement with a limit of not less than Twenty-?ive
xllion Dollars

(52s,000,000,

combined single li.it

for

personal

^ u r y and property damage per occurrence, with deductible or self
— n e e not greater than rifty T h o u s a n d ^ ^
^ . ^ _
-S shall furnish to OTA certificates of ^surar,,-• • •
"•. -nsurance eviaencmg the
rave coverage in the form of a policv far „„i ,• •
poncy (or policies) at the time of
:ecution of this Coordination Agreement.

such insurance shall

n t a m a contractual liability endorsement which will cover the

™~A under this Coordination Agreement and an
obligations assumed under ui
* mir,fl UTA as -additional insured." In addition, such
endorsement naming
UTA as
.a l l contain notification provisions whereby the
insurance shall
conta-m
™,nv aorees to give thirty (30) days' written notice
insurance company agrees v. ?
. a n „ £„ 0 r cancellation of the policy. All of
-to the UTA of any change
xn or
- and
,nH notice
notice p^
provisions shall be stated on the
these endorsements
„,-« which
to UTA.
certificate of insurance
whicn is
is to
t be provided
e

SECTION

13.

13.!
referenced

Gmm^mm^s
This

Coordination

Agreement

and

the

agreements

herein constitute the entire agreement between the

parties hereto with respect to the subject matter contained herein
and

there

are

no

agreements,

understandings, restrictions,

warranties or representations between the parties other than those
set forth or provided for herein. All Exhibits attached hereto are
hereby incorporated by reference into, and made part of, this
Coordination Agreement.

1 3 .2

This coordination Agreement may not be amended except by

an instrument in writing signed by the parties'hereto.

,3 3 waiver of any provision of this Coordination Agreement,
in whole or in part, can be made only by an agreement in writing
signed by the parties and such vaiver in any one instance shall not
^ anv other provision in the same instance,
constitute a w~ver of any otb
WUML

nor any waiver of the same provision in another instance h .
. .
- instance, but each
provision shall continue in full force and effect with
ej-iect with resDect to
any other then existing or subsequent breach.
13.4 A notice or demand to be civen h v „„
Y
, , ,.
° n e P a r t y to the othe>shall be given in writing by personal service
l.
lce t e
.,
' telegram, express
w
*ail, federal Express, D H L or any other similar form Qf ^ ^
^
K

delivery service, or mailing in the United states mail, p o s t a l
prepaid, certified, return receiot revested
ar,d „,,
* S c e d ^d addressed to such
party as follows:
(a)

in t o . c*s a «* . » o t i c s

ittentlm:

General

S4130-0810, vita

" " ^

a copy to

or c o m m m l c a t i o n

P

- «• s ° * -axe,

.

^

D_

salt

uswai

(b, in th. case of . notice « c

o

™

^

tQ th£

^

city,

^

« . Attorney for tha

^

^ to S L S

£ddressad

to the principal office of SLS, Attention- r
' A t t e n t a o n - General Manager, Carl
Hollowell, P. o. Box 57366, Murray, or 84157 with
13/
' w x t k a copy to the
p--ldant

—

.

« « «
-xt«g

o f

x,

R a i l I e x

s e r v i c e s >

^

7S209 o r a d d r e s s e d

p a r t y as ttat p a « y *ay.
dispone* a. p r o v i d e d

_

l n c

;

< o 4 o

B r M d v a y

such o t h e r

from tiae tQ

ta

^

_

^

a a

^^ ^ ^ ^
^

Section_

^ ^ ^ ^
w i

^

^
^

^

demands, requests, and other communication. , „
, ln
^ ^ i c a u i o n s under this Agreement
>nall be m writing and shall be deemed D r C n . H
ea P r °P e ^ly served and to have
' e e n d u l y <3i™* d) on the date of d * n „
of delivery, if delivered
personally on the party to whom notice is „<„
e
is given, o r if m a d e by
elecopy directed to the party to whom notice
•
i C e lis
s to H
to be given at the

I v.

VAXU

t e l e c o p y number l i s t e d below, or ( i i ) an r e c e i p t , if mailed t o the
p a r t y t o whom notice i s to be given by r e g i s t e r e d or c e r t i f i e d
mail,

r e t u r n receipt requested,

postage

prepaid

and

properly

addressed*
13-5 If any provision of t h i s Coordination Agreement s h a l l be
h e l d or be deemed to be or s h a l l , in f a c t ,

be i l l e g a l ,

invalid,

i n o p e r a t i v e or unenforceable as applied i n any p a r t i c u l a r case in
any j u r i s d i c t i o n or j u r i s d i c t i o n s or in a l l j u r i s d i c t i o n s or in a l l
c a s e s because i t conflicts with any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n or provisions
hereof

or any constitution or s t a t u t e or r u l e of law or public

p o l i c y , or for amy other reason, such circums^cances s h a l l not have
t h e e f f e c t of rendering the provision i n question inoperative or
unenforceable in any other case or circumstance or of rendering any
o t h e r provision or provisions herein contained i l l e g a l ,
inoperative,
invalidity
sections

or unenforceable

to

any

of any one or more p h r a s e s ,

extent

whatever.

sentences,

of t h i s Coordination Agreement s h a l l

invalid,

clauses

not affect

The
or
the

remaining portions of t h i s Coordination Agreement or any p a r t
thereof.

13-6

This Coordination Agreement: (i) c o n t a i n s headings only

f o r convenience, which headings do not form p a r t of and s h a l l not
be used in construction; and ( i i ) i s not intended to inure to the
b e n e f i t of any person or e n t i t y not a p a r t y .
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13.7

All of the tara and previsions of this Coordination

Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of, and be
enforceable by, the parties hereto and their respective successors
- d permitted assigns, ^cept to a corporate parent, subsidiary or
ether affiiiate, SLS aay not assign its rights or obligations under
this Coordination Agreement-

13.8
counterparts,
»11

of

which

This

Coordination

Agreement

may

be

executed

each of which s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d an o r i g i n a l ,
together

shall

constitute

b u t one

and t h e

m
but

same

instrument.

13.9

T h i s C o o r d i n a t i o n Agreement
y -aenu
c o n s t r u e d u n d e r t h e laws of t h e S t a t e of
wt
of laws p r i n c i p l e s .

IN

WITNESS WHEREOF,

s h * n >,
s n a i l b e g o v e r n e d by and
Utah
i ^ i ,, •
unan, i n c l u d i n g c o n f l i c t

the

p a r t i e s h e - P - n >,
* - u x e s n e r e u o h a v e caused t h i s
C o o r d i n a t i o n Agreement t o be e x e c u t e d a s a s « i ^ * *
25 a
s e a l e d i n s t r u m e n t a s of
the
date
first
set forth
above by t h e i r - * „ i
u •
"I
T^ieir d u l y
authorized
representatives.
WITNESS:
SALT LAKE CITY SOUTHERN
RAILROAD CO., I N C .

3

^ /£/'.. Ztt4i?^:

Title:

i

.-T~>

UTA0045
J/29/93 Coordin.Ag7

27

WITNESS:

UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY

By:
T i t l e '.yd^ci^^

-?77^4^L.
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EXHIBIT "A"
DESCRIPTION OF TRACKAGE SUBJECT TO SLS'S FREIGHT EASEMENT
HP's freight railroad line located between Ninth Street
Junction, on the north side of NINTH (900) SOUTH STREET,
Salt Lake City, Utah (approximately milepost 798*74) and
the
Salt Lake County/Utah County boundary
line
(approximately
milepost
775.19)
consisting
of
approximately 23.55 miles, as shown on the UP's Chief
Engineer's Alignment Maps of the Union Pacific Provo
Subdivision Line and as shown on the Oregon Shortline
Railroad Station Maps - Lands aka Property Accounting
Valuation Maps;
UP's spur freight railroad line which departs in a
southwesterly direction from the Provo Subdivision Line
at
approximately
6400
South
in
Murray,
Utah
(approximately milepost 790.52) crossing under both the
1-15 freeway and the DSRGW Railroad main line, and then
heading south to approximately 7400 South, to the point
of
intersection
with
the
D&RGW
right
of
way
(approximately milepost 1.402), a distance of about 1.4
miles, as shown on the UP's Chief Engineer's Aliqnment
Maps of the Union Pacific Provo Subdivision Line and as
shown on the Oregon Shortline Railroad Station Maps Lands aka Property Accounting Valuation Maps;
The trackage on that portion of the Property sold bv Seller to
UTA located in the center of historic Sandy (Old Town) which
extends from approximately 8 600 South to 9000 South along the
UTPRR Right-Of-Way and running from approximately 150 East to
190 East; the east-west width of this property is
approximately 260 feet, more or less, with the exception of a
small portion on the north end which is narrower", and its
length from north to south is approximately 2560 feet;
The trackage on that portion of the Property sold by Seller to
UTA situated between 5410 and 5830 South Streets at 300 Wesr
and which is approximately 2500 feet long and 125 feet wide.
BUT LESS AND EXCEPTING THEREFROM TEE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED
PARCELS OF PROPERTY WHICH ARE NOT INCLUDED IN OR SUBJECT TO
THE FREIGHT RAILROAD OPERATING EASEMENT:
SEE THE DESCRIPTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES

UTA0047

(Exhibic "A" coacinued)

A piece of
auSrter of
? £ 3 £ of
West, Salt

land one hundred (100) fest wide, situate in the Southwest
the Northeast quarter, and the Northwest quarter of the Southeast
Action Thirteen (13), Township Two (2) South Range One,(1)
Lake Meridian, and more fully described as follows, to-wic:

Beginning at a point on the East and West center line of said Section
Thirteen (13) seven hundred forty-nine and one tenth 749.1) feet Ease rrom
t h e c S ? e r of said section, said point being f i f t y (50) feet East along said
c ^ t l r l i n e of said section from where i t i s intersected by the center l i n e
S ? 2 * rlit J r a S of the Oregon Short Line Railroad; thence North no degress
f ^ ^ " J S S s fO*30M East on a l i n e parallel with said canter l i n e or
and t h i r t y f " ^ ^ 0 ^ V f ^ f d1 ^tant therefrom at right angles, six
d e a r S s aid f i f t y minutes (81-50')East, one hundred one and fifteen
degress ano r i r t y »
v
deoress and thirty annutes
C
^ ^ l
? J ^ hundred s i S ? t w o and seventy-three hundredths (862.73)
i Q l Q ) ^ ^ H t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
and thirty minutes (89"30«) West one
f e e t ; thence North f 1 ^ ^ ™ e „ 2 * /en) feJ3+- Easterly from aforesaid center
UnTTf m a W S o? * 5 ° r e g o ^ o ^ L i n T R a n S a " ^thence North no
d w r ^ s S d thirty Smrttt ( o V ) East two hundred tin rty-thrse and
s l e i g h t hundredths (233.58) feet to the place or beginning.

A . t r i p of land 100 « ^ ^ t t f ^ ^ o ^ i S ^
£ * ? \
^ V H ^ O T
S ^ ^ S ^ S ' s t o r t - L l S Railroad Company. Said strip
ge^n^^orllarticuTarly f e l c n b l d as follows:
Beginning at a point 1854.feet more or l e s s West and 311 feet aore.or ^
l e s s South of f / " ^ ^ S
S r e g o f s n o r t t i n e S i S a d SO feet from
F
Se ^
? ? \ n / ? t s Iain line and at the Southwest comer of the
the center l i n e of ^ " ^ i V " r ^ n v ' s nrooertv thence South 0°30' W.,
American Smelting and Retning Company s property. £ « «
^
p a r a l l e l to said center 1 ne 1691.£ ™ - - ^ « ^ N a r t n
u]
South s i d e of ^ B e r , e r - s ^
Y J P * £ £ $ ^ ^ ^ *

; 0 1 ^ ^ f ^ ^

min

line

, 1687.

feet to the place of beginning.

UTA0048

(Exhibit "A"'' ccmclnueji)

The following described land claim, to wit; Part of Lot thre* (3) and nar*
of the Southeast quarter of the farthest quarter of Section Six (6) in "
Township Three (3) South, of Range One (1) East, Salt Lake Meridian!
Beginning eight 5/10 (8 5/10) rods East from the Northwest corner of said
l o t three; thence East nineteen40/100 reds; thence South one hundred and
sixty (150) rods; thence West nineteen 40/100 rods; thence West one hundreand sixty (150) rods to the place of beginning.
Less and excepting the follovn-ng parcels of prooertv «h-r<->, 3r-n «„ i • ., • Che Retained Freighc Operating Z a s L e a c :

P^P^y,

vaicn

are

included v x c s :

1- That portion within t h e bounds at the e x i s t i n e s i n e l e
- : L n e through t r a c k which i s a g n r c r ^ t a i y 65 feet i n width."
2 . That porticn of t h e land -lying betwesa t h e s i n c i e Linirrough
t r a d e and 14 feet East and a b u t t i n g the c a n t e r l i n e c^
i e
E a s t e r l y most track of t h e e x i s t i n g s i d i n g t r a c k s i t u a t e d " in
•eta 40, 49, and 62, Sandy S t a t i o n P l a t .
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EXHIBIT "B"
DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT CONDITION OF TRACK, GRADE CROSSINGS
AND SIGNAL FACILITIES REGARDING THE PROPERTY AS OF CLOSING

TRACK:

The entirety of the main track rails on the Property are 133 pound
rails (133 pounds per yard) and are in good condition.
The main track on the Property between the Salt Lake County/Utah
County boundary line and north of the north end of Pallas Yard, at
approximately 5330 South, Murray, Utah is FRA Class III because of
the condition of the railroad ties.
The main track between approximately 5330 South, Murray, Utah, and
Ninth Street Junction, approximately 3 00 feet north of the norrh
side of 900 South Street in Salt Lake City, Utah is generally FRA
Class III but with several areas that are only FRA Class II because
of the condition of railroad ties and occasional insufficient
cross levelling.
All sour tracks, team tracks and yard tracks on the Property,
including the tracks at Pallas Yard, are FRA Class I.
SIGNAL FACILITIES:
All of the signal facilities regarding the Property are in good
working condition.
GRADE CROSSINGS:
All of the grade crossings regarding the Property are in good
condition.

UTA0050
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LEXSEE 2004 UT 80
Edward George Goebel and Kathy Goebel, Plaintiffs, Appellants, and CrossAppellees, v. Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Salt Lake City Corporation, Inc., Omni Products, Inc., Union Pacific Railroad Company, Utah Transit District, Defendants, Appellees, and Cross-Appellants.
No. 20020825
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
2004 UT 80; 104 P3d 1185; 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 39; 2004 Utah LEXIS 185
October 1,2004, Filed
JBSEQUENT HISTORY: [***1J Released for Pubation February 04, 2005 .Rehearing denied by Goebel
Omni Prods., 2005 Utah LEXIS 19 (Utah, Jan. 20,
05)

63-30-11 (3)(b)(ii), which demanded strict compliance,
was retroactively applicable. The trial court correctly
found a "protuberance" in the road was not a proximate
cause of the accident and the statutory duty did not give
rise to liability absent notice.

JOR HISTORY: Third District, Salt Lake. The Honble Tyrone Medley.

OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed.

^POSITION: Affirmed.

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

SE SUMMARY:

3CEDURAL POSTURE: In a premises liability
, the Third District, Salt Lake (Utah) granted a di?d verdict and made other rulings in favor of defenrailroad, and granted summary judgment for defencity. Plaintiff injured bicycle rider and his wife aplA. The railroad cross-appealed.
^RVIEW: The injured bicycle rider, riding over a
>ad crossing, crashed, sustaining serious injuries.
railroad was using the crossing for freight service
tant to an easement, and the city was responsible for
taining the street leading up to the crossing. The
ad had an easement to use the tracks, subject to the
of an agreement. The trial court correctly granted
lilroad's motion for directed verdict and correctly
ssed the injured bicycle rider's negligence claim
Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11. As it was unnecessary
resolution of the issues, the appellate court did not
;s whether the railroad owed the injured bicycle
duty of care pursuant to the agreement or whether
il court abused its discretion in excluding evidence
Utah R. Evid. 403. The trial court correctly
I the city's motion for summary judgment on the
is that the 1998 amendment to Utah Code Ann. §

Civil Procedure > Trials > Judgment as Matter of Law
[HN1] Appellate courts review a trial court's grant of
directed verdict for correctness. For a directed verdict to
be appropriate, the evidence must be such that reasonable
minds could not differ on the facts based on the evidence
presented at trial. Appellate courts examine the evidence
in the light most favorable to the losing party, and if that
evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
would support a judgment in favor of the losing party,
must reverse. If evidence raises a question of material
fact, it is reversible error for a trial court to grant a motion for directed verdict.
Civil Procedure > Jury Trials > Province of Court &
Jury
Torts > Causation > Proximate Cause
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >
Issues of Fact & Law
[HN2] Proximate cause is an issue of fact and is, therefore, not typically resolved by the court in a jury trial. It
is legal error for a court to grant a directed verdict on the
issue of causation unless there is no evidence from which
a reasonable jury might conclude that a breach of a duty
proximately caused the plaintiffs injury. Put another
way, if there is any doubt about whether something was a
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proximate cause of the plaintiff s injuries, the court must
not decide the issue as a matter of law
Transportation Law > Rail Transportation > Personal
Injury & Property Damage
[HN3] See Utah Code Ann § 10-7-26(2) (2003)
Transportation Law > Rail Transportation > Maintenance & Safety
[HN4] See Utah Code Ann § 10-7-29(2003)
Transportation Law > Rail Transportation > Maintenance & Safety
[HN5] Utah Code Ann § 56-1-11 (2000) states that
every railroad company shall be liable for damages
caused by its neglect to make and maintain good and
sufficient crossmgs at points where any line of travel
crosses its road Salt Lake City, Utah, Code § 14 44 030
requires railway companies to keep portions of streets
across which then: tracks are constructed and maintained
m good and safe condition for public travel Salt Lake
City, Utah, Code § 14 44 030(1987)
Torts > Real Property Torts > General Premises Liability
[HN6] The mere fact that Utah Code Ann § 56-1-11
(2000) and Salt Lake City, Utah, Code § 14 44 030
(1987) do not mention notice does not mean that negligence can be found under them m the absence of notice
Torts > Negligence > Proof of Negligence > Breach of
Statute
[HN7] The omission or commission of somethmg m violation of a valid statute, or of any ordinance reasonable m
its terms, is negligence, or evidence of negligence
Torts > Negligence > Proof of Negligence > Breach of
Statute
[HN8] Generally, violations by a railroad of its duty under an ordmance with respect to crossing constitutes, or
at least gives evidence of, actionable negligence
Torts > Real Property Torts > General Premises Liability
[HN9] Fault cannot be imputed to a defendant so that
liability results therefrom unless two conditions are met
(A) that he had knowledge of the condition, that is, either
actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the
condition had existed long enough that he should have
discovered it, and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that m the exercise of reasonable care
he should have remedied it
Torts > Real Property Torts > General Premises Liability

[HN10] Where a defendant in a premises liability case
either created the condition, or is responsible for it, he is
deemed to know of the condition, and no further proof of
notice is necessary
Torts > Real Property Torts > General Premises Liability
[HN11] In premises liability cases, if a plaintiff alleges
that a defendant negligently failed to remedy a dangerous
condition that the defendant did not create, negligently
failed to repair a dangerous malfunction m an otherwise
safe system, or negligently allowed an otherwise safe
condition to degrade over time into a dangerous condition, then evidence of notice and a reasonable time to
remedy are required to survive a motion for summary
judgment or directed verdict These requirements do not
apply where the negligence claim requires the plaintiff to
establish that the defendant actually created the dangerous condition or purposefully built the dangerous condition into the system for which the defendant is responsible The rationale behind these distmct rules is that it is
reasonable to presume that a party has notice of conditions that the party itself creates, but it is not reasonable
to presume notice of conditions that someone else creates, that arise from malfunctions, or that gradually
evolve on then: own
Torts > Real Property Torts > Nuisances
[HN12] See Utah Code Ann § 76-10-803(1995)
Torts > Real Property Torts > Nuisances
[HN13] A private party seeking damages for the creation
of a public nuisance must either show that a defendant's
action constituted nuisance per se, or demonstrate that
the defendant's conduct was unreasonable in order to
impose liability
Torts > Real Property Torts > Nuisances
[HN14] Conduct creating a nuisance which harms a
plaintiff is unreasonable only where it is intentional, negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous
Torts > Real Property Torts > General Premises Liability
[HN15] Failure to repair a defective condition about
which one neither knows nor reasonably should know is
neither negligent nor unreasonable That is why notice is
a requirement
Civil Procedure > Dismissal of Actions > Involuntary
Dismissal
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >
Standards Generally
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[HN16] Appellate courts review a trial court's decision to
dismiss a claim for correctness, giving no deference to its
legal conclusions on the issue.
Transportation Law > Rail Transportation > Maintetance & Safety
HN17] Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11 (2000) provides that
very railroad company shall be liable for damages
aused by its neglect to make and maintain good and
ufficient crossings at points where any line of travel
rosses its road.
ivil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Preservaon for Review
INI8] Appellate courts generally do not decide issues
inecessary to the outcome of the case, and are disinined to issue advisory opinions.
vil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >
mse of Discretion
idence > Relevance > Confusion, Prejudice & Waste
Time
idence > Procedural Considerations > Rulings on
idence
W9] Any litigant seeking to overturn a trial court's
ision to exclude evidence on the basis of Utah R.
d. 403 faces a heavy burden: appellate courts review
ial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence unUtah R. Evid. 403 under an abuse of discretion stani, and will not overturn a lower court's determination
dmissibility unless it is beyond the limits of reasonity.
ernments > Legislation > Effect & Operation >
pective & Retrospective Operation
1
Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >
dards Generally
20] Appellate courts review for correctness quesregarding the law applicable in a case, including the
of whether a given law can or should be applied
actively.
rnments > State & Territorial Governments >
ts By & Against
1] The Immunity Act demands strict compliance
ts requirements to allow suit against governmental
s. The notice of claim provision, particularly, neiontemplates nor allows for anything less. The nof claim is to be directed and delivered to the reble governmental entity according to the requireof Utah Code Ann. § § 63-30-12 or 63-30-13.
:ode Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii) (1997). Utah Code
\ 63-30-13 requires filing of the notice of claim
be governing body of the political subdivision
one year of the date on which the claim arose.

Governments > Legislation > Effect & Operation >
Prospective & Retrospective Operation
[HN22] A statute is not to be applied retroactively unless
the statute expressly declares that it operates retroactively. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000). As a general
rule, retroactivity is not favored in the law. This rule applies only with respect to substantive laws, however;
statutes that do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy substantive rights can be applied retroactively. Convenience,
reasonableness, and justice are factors considered in deciding whether a statute has a merely remedial or procedural purpose.
Governments > Legislation > Effect & Operation >
Prospective & Retrospective Operation
[HN23] When analyzing whether applying a statute as
amended would have retroactive effects inconsistent with
the usual rule that legislation is deemed to be prospective, courts should use a common sense, functional
judgment about whether the new provision attaches new
legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. This judgment should be informed and guided
by familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.
Governments > Legislation > Effect & Operation >
Prospective & Retrospective Operation
[HN24] Considering the strong presumptions against
retroactivity in the law, and the common sense, functional factors that are considered in deciding whether to
apply a law retroactively, courts should err on the side of
finding a statute substantive if they have doubt about the
issue.
COUNSEL: Peter C. Collins, Salt Lake, for plaintiffs.
E. Scott Savage, Casey K. McGarvey, Martha S. Stonebrook, Salt Lake, for defendants.
JUDGES: DURHAM, Chief Justice. Associate Chief
Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Chief Justice Durham's opinion.
OPINIONBY: DURHAM
OPINION: [**1188] DURHAM, Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
[*P1]
Plaintiffs-appellants Edward and Kathy
Goebel (the Goebels) appeal a grant of directed verdict
and other rulings in favor of defendant-appellee Salt
Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc. (Southern),
and a grant of summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake
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City Corporation (the City). In brief, the Goebels argue
that the trial court committed reversible error by:

(1) ruling that, as a matter of law, a certain roadway obstacle could not have been
a proximate cause of Mr. Goebel's injuries;
(2) ruling that the Goebels were required
to give Southern actual or constructive
notice of their claim in order to survive
Southern's motion for a directed verdict,
despite a duty [***2] imposed upon
Southern by Utah Code sections 10-726(2), 10-7-29, and 56-1-11, and Salt
Lake City Code § 14.44.030, and that
they had failed to adduce evidence from
which a reasonable jury could find that
Southern had such notice;
(3) failing to find that notice could be
"presumed" in this case based on the alleged "permanence" of a dangerous condition;
(4) failing to find that evidence of the indeterminate length of time that the dangerous condition may have existed could
support a jury finding that Southern had
constructive notice of the condition;
(5) finding that notice is required in a
statute-based public nuisance claim under
Utah Code section 76-10-803;
(6) finding that an agreement between
Union Pacific Railroad Company (Union
Pacific) and Southern did not impose on
Southern a duty of care toward Mr.
Goebel;
(7) excluding an expert witness's empirical testing evidence from trial; and
[**1189]
(8) retroactively applying
amended notice of claim requirements of
the Governmental Immunity Act with respect to the Goebels* claims against Salt
Lake City.
[*P2] Southern cross-appeals, arguing that the trial
court erred in ruling that Utah Code sections [***3] 107-26, 10-7-29, and 56-1-11, and Salt Lake City Code §
14.44.030 apply to Southern.

[*P3] We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[*P4] On February 19, 1998, Mr. Goebel was riding his bicycle on 1700 South Street over a railroad
crossing near 200 West Street when he crashed, sustaining serious injuries. The Goebels' theory about what
caused the accident focused partly on the rubber mats,
called "field panels," that were a component of the crossing. The Goebels therefore brought suit against Omni
Products, Inc., because its predecessor had manufactured
the field panels. Additionally, the Goebels sued Union
Pacific, which had installed the field panels, and Utah
Transit Authority (UTA), which owned the rail line and
crossing. The Goebels settled with each of these defendants before trial, and none of them are parties to this
appeal. The remaining defendants who are parties to this
appeal are Southern, which was using UTA's crossing for
freight service pursuant to an easement, and the City,
which was responsible for maintaining the street leading
up to the crossing.
[*P5] The tracks at the crossing had been owned
by Union Pacific, but Union Pacific sold the tracks to
[***4] UTA prior to Mr. Goebel's accident. Southern
was formed in 1992 to continue freight service on the
tracks, while UTA took on the passenger service. When
Union Pacific sold the tracks to UTA, it retained a limited easement for the purpose of freight service, which it
then immediately transferred to Southern. Southern then
entered into an Administration and Coordination Agreement (Agreement) with UTA. The Agreement specified
that Southern could run freight trains on tracks that UTA
designated as "Freight Trackage." Thus, UTA owned the
tracks, and Southern had an easement to use the tracks
for freight purposes, subject to the terms of the Agreement. The Agreement required Southern to maintain
freight trackage crossings as necessary for freight rail
service.
[*P6] At trial, the Goebels attempted to present
evidence supporting their theory that a "protuberance"-the Goebels' term—in the road caused Mr. Goebel to steer
his bicycle into a gap between field panels at the crossing. The field panels raised the level of the roadway almost to the level of the rails. The field panels were laid
next to each other, but over time, the Goebels theorized,
a gap running parallel to Mr. Goebel's [***5] direction
of travel grew between two of the field panels. The
Goebels theorized that Mr. Goebel's accident occurred
because the front tire of Mr. Goebel's bicycle—a road
bicycle with relatively narrow wheels and tires—entered
the gap and jammed against one of the rails.
[*P7J Notwithstanding the Goebels' theories, however, no witnesses actually saw, and Mr. Goebel cannot
actually remember, what caused the accident. Southern
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presented evidence to support its competing theory of
what caused Mr. Goebel's accident. According to Southern's theory, the gap was not even involved in Mr.
joebel's accident.

mate cause of [Mr. Goebel's] injuries . . . . It may very
well be a factor in this accident, but . . . no dangerous
gap, no accident. The dangerous gap is the proximate
cause of the injuries [of] which plaintiff complains."

[*P8J In an order dated July 8, 2002, the trial court
,ranted the City's motion for summary judgment. The
ourt granted in part Southern's motion for a directed
erdict in an order dated August 29, 2002. The court's
ictual findings and legal conclusions as related to these
rders are presented as relevant below.

[*P12] [HN2] Proximate cause is an issue of fact
and is, therefore, not typically resolved by the court in a
jury trial. See Mackay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp., 2000 UT
15, PI2, 995 P.2d 1233. [***8] It is legal error for a
court to grant a directed verdict on the issue of causation
unless there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury
might conclude that a breach of a duty proximately
caused the plaintiffs injury. See Mahmood, 1999 UT
104 at P2L Put another way, if there is any doubt about
whether something was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries, the court must not decide the issue as a
matter of law. See Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d
130, 133 (Utah 1978).

ANALYSIS
I. THE DIRECTED VERDICT
[*P9] The Goebels' first and most significant arment is that the trial court erred in granting Southern's
)tion for directed verdict because: (1) there was evince presented [**1190] at trial from which a jury
aid conclude [***6] that Southern had constructive
ice of the protuberance, that it had a duty to fix the
>tuberance, and that its failure to fix the protuberance
ximately caused Mr. Goebel to crash; (2) the Goebels
not need to present evidence that Southern had no, because state law imposes an affirmative duty to
ntain the crossing; (3) pursuant to Schnuphase v.
-ehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1986), Southshould be presumed to have had notice because the
was a permanent unsafe condition in a crossing for
:h Southern was responsible; (4) the jury could have
xed that Southern had constructive notice of the gap
i evidence that gaps often form gradually over time;
(5) notice was not required as an element of the
>els' public nuisance claim.
[*P10] [HN1] We review a trial court's grant of dii verdict for correctness. For a directed verdict to be
>priate, the evidence must be such that reasonable
5 could not differ on the facts based on the evidence
ited at trial. Mgmt. Comm. of Graystone Pines
owners Ass'n v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d
W-98 (Utah 1982). We examine the evidence in
ht [***7] most favorable to the losing party, and if
ddence and the reasonable inferences drawn thereivould support a judgment in favor of the losing
we must reverse. Id. If evidence raises a "question
erial fact," it is reversible error for a trial court to
t motion for directed verdict. See Mahmood v.
999 UT104, PI6, 990P.2d933.
The Significance of the Protuberance
Pll] The Goebels take issue with the trial court's
that the protuberance was not a proximate cause
joebel's damages, and further argue that Southern
h constructive notice of the existence of the pro:e and a duty to repair it. The trial court found
a matter of law, the protuberance is not a proxi-

[*P13] According to the Goebels* theory of the
case, it was the gap that actually caused Mr. Goebel to
fall, and the trial court did find that the gap was the
proximate cause of the accident. Mr. Goebel argues that
he steered his front wheel into the gap because he was
avoiding the protuberance, but this does not mean that
the existence of the protuberance necessarily forced Mr.
Goebel to steer into the gap. From the evidence presented, no reasonable jury could find that the protuberance proximately caused Mr. Goebel to steer into the
gap. The protuberance was no more a cause of Mr.
Goebel's accident than his decision to ride his bicycle
that day, or the weather. [***9] After reviewing the
evidence, we agree with the trial court and Southern that
Mr. Goebel could have steered his bicycle into the gap
regardless of whether the protuberance existed at all. The
trial court was therefore correct in finding as a matter of
law that the protuberance was not a proximate cause of
the accident.
B. Whether Notice Is Required Where Statutes Impose an Affirmative Duty
[*P14J Building upon the trial court's ruling that
Southern is a "railway company" [**1191] that owed
the Goebels a duty of care pursuant to Utah Code sections 10-7-26(2), 10-7-29, and 56-1-11, and Salt Lake
City Code section 14.44.030, the Goebels argue that
where the duty owed is based upon these statutes, no
showing of notice is required, and the trial court therefore erred in granting the motion for directed verdict for
failure to prove notice. Southern argues that these statutes do not apply to Southern because it is not a "railway
company" within the meaning of the statutes, and that
even if they do apply, they do not require Southern to
take action without prior notice of the need to do so.
[*P15] The relevant portion of Utah Code section
10-7-26(2) provides that [HN3] nothing in this section
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[***10] or in other sections to which it refers is to be
construed as exempting

any railway company from keeping every
portion of every street and alley used by it
and upon or across which tracks shall be
constructed at or near the grade of such
streets in good and safe condition for public travel, but it shall keep the same
planked, paved, macadamized or otherwise in such condition for public travel as
the governing body of the city or town
may from time to time direct.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-26(2) (2003). "Railway company" is defined as "any company which owns or operates railway tracks on, along or across a street or alley in
any city or town." Id. § 10-7-26(1). Utah Code section
10-7-29 provides, in pertinent part, that

[HN4] the tracks of all railway companies
when located upon the streets or avenues
of a city or town shall be kept in repair
and safe in all respects for the use of the
traveling public, and such companies shall
be liable for all damages resulting by reason of neglect to keep such tracks in repair . . . . For injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of any such
company to keep its tracks in proper repair [***11] . . . such company shall be
liable and the city or town shall be exempt
from liability.

Id. § 10-7-29 (2003). For purposes of this section, a
"railway company" is defined both as "any company
which owns or operates railway tracks," id. § 10-726(1), and as any company "owning or operating any . . .
railway," Id. § 10-7-29. [HN5] Utah Code section 56-111 states that "every railroad company shall be liable for
damages caused by its neglect to make and maintain
good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of
travel crosses its road." Id. § 56-1-11 (2000). Salt Lake
City Code section 14.44.030 requires "railway companies" to keep portions of streets "across which their
tracks . . . are constructed and maintained" in good and
safe condition for public travel. Salt Lake City, Utah,
Code§ 14.44.030(1987).
[*P16] Southern argues that the trial court erred in
finding Southern owed a statutory duty of care to the
Goebels because while Southern does operate rolling

stock upon the railroad tracks, only UTA actually owns
and operates the railroad tracks. We agree with the
Goebels and the trial court that these statutes, by their
[***12] plain language, imposed a duty upon Southern
to keep the crossing safe for the traveling public. Although Southern's operation of the railroad tracks in
question is limited to freight service pursuant to the
easement, and is governed by the Agreement, Southern is
nonetheless a railroad company operating a "railway"
within the meaning of the statutes, because it operates
trains upon the railroad tracks. According to the Agreement, Southern has the "exclusive authority to manage,
direct and control all railroad and railroad-related operations on" the tracks designated for freight use, and has
"exclusive authority to control operations of all trains,
locomotives, railcars and rail equipment and the movement and speed of the same." As the trial court explained, the "'operating a railway' language . . . is broad
enough to encompass Southern's operation, use and utilization of the easement that they had supported by the
evidence in this particular case." Only different statutory
language or different factual circumstances could convince us that Southern's regular and longstanding use and
control of trains on the railway did not amount to operation of a railway. The trial court therefore [***13) correctly interpreted the statutes in this regard.
[**1192] [*P17] While we agree that Southern
owed a duty to the Goebels, however, that does not mean
that the statutes obviate the need for the Goebels to show
notice. The essence of the Goebels' argument on this
point is simply the observation that the statutes do not
mention a notice requirement. However, [HN6] the mere
fact that the statutes do not mention notice does not mean
that negligence could be found in the absence of notice.
As the Goebels themselves acknowledge, it is negligence
law-not strict liability-that provides the foundation for
liability under these statutes. See Oswald v. Utah Light
& Ry. Co., 39 Utah 245, 117 P. 46, 47 (Utah 1911) (explaining in negligence case involving streetcar company
that[HN7] "the omission or commission of something in
violation of a valid statute, or of any ordinance reasonable in its terms, is negligence, or evidence of negligence"); Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 24.721 (3d ed. 2002) [HN8] ("Generally,
violations by a railroad of its duty under an ordinance
with respect to crossing constitutes, or at least gives evidence of, actionable negligence."). Because, [***14] as
we discuss in detail below, notice is a fundamental component of the negligence equation in such cases as this
one, the trial court correctly found that the duty imposed
by the statutes does not give rise to liability in the absence of notice.
C. Whether Notice Can Be Presumed from th<
"Permanent" Nature of the Gap
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[*P18] Citing a "long line of cases in Utah" that includes Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 PJd 476
(Utah 1986), the trial court held that notice was required
to establish negligence in this case. Furthermore, the
:ourt found, after evaluating the evidence presented in
he light most favorable to the Goebels, that the Goebels
lad presented

no competent evidence that [1] a dangerous gap existed prior to the accident or
that [2] a dangerous gap existed for a period of time sufficient to allow Southern
to discover it and a sufficient amount of
time for Southern to remedy it. . . . The
best . . . the evidence establishes . . . is
that dangerous gaps develop over time.
In this court's view, that does not
constitute competent evidence to allow
the jury to make a reasonable inference as
to how long it existed prior to the accident
[***15J or when it existed prior to the
accident. If you can't establish duration,
[and] you can't establish when it existed,
it appears to me that only through speculation can the jury attempt to reach those
conclusions in an effort to determine
whether or not there was sufficient time to
impart notice and sufficient time to remedy.

Goebels argue that the gap was "permanent," and
under Schnuphase, this permanence creates a pretion that Southern knew about the gap. Thus, while
ial court interpreted Schnuphase as requiring evi' of actual or constructive notice, the Goebels interchnuphase as creating a presumption of notice.
*P19] In Schnuphase, the plaintiff was a business
5 in a grocery store who slipped and fell on a scoop
cream dropped by another customer. 918 PJd at
>iscussing store owners' duty of reasonable care in
d fall cases, we quoted a previous decision, Allen
crated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 PJd 175 (Utah
identifying two classes of such cases. See
hase, 918 P.2d at 478. The first class, to which
hase belonged, was that [***16] involving temunsafe conditions. Id. Cases in this class, we ex> require actual or constructive notice for liability
i:

It is quite universally held that [HN9]
fault cannot be imputed to the defendant
so that liability results therefrom unless
two conditions are met: (A) that he had
knowledge of the condition, that is, either
actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the condition had existed
long enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge,
sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise
of reasonable care he should have remedied it.

(**1193] Id. (quoting Allen, 538 PJd at 176). The
second class of cases, however,

involves some unsafe condition of a permanent nature, such as: in the structure of
the building, or of a stairway, etc. or in
equipment or machinery, or in the manner
of use, which was created or chosen by
the defendant (or his agents), or for which
he is responsible. In such circumstances,
[HN10] where the defendant either created the condition, or is responsible for it,
he is deemed to know of the condition;
and no further proof of notice is necessary.

Id. (quoting Allen, 538 PJd at 176). [***17] While the
trial court believed this case falls into the first category
of cases requiring notice, the Goebels argue that the gap
was an "unsafe condition of a permanent nature," to
which Southern was "responsible." Therefore, the
Goebels reason, the instant case falls within the second
class of cases, requiring no showing of notice.
[*P20] We conclude, however, that the instant case
does not fall within the no-notice category of cases that
we articulated in Allen and Schnuphase because here, the
defendant did not create the unsafe condition, and is "responsible" for it only in the context of maintenance, not
for its existence in the first place. Instead, this case is
analogous to Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969
PJd 403 (Utah 1998), where we found that a plaintiffs
failure to present evidence of notice and opportunity to
remedy was fatal to his case. The plaintiff in Fishbaugh
had been crossing a street at night when he was hit by a
car. Id. None of the streetlights were functioning. Consequently, in addition to suing the driver of the car, the
plaintiff sued the power company for negligently failing
to maintain or [***18J operate the streetlights. Id. The
plaintiff also sued the city, claiming that the street was in
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a dangerous condition, and that the city had negligently
failed to repair the lights even though it knew about the
lighting problem before the accident. Id. The city and the
power company both moved for summary judgment,
based partly on their argument that they "had no notice
of the outage prior to the accident and thus could not be
held negligent" Id. A key issue on appeal was whether
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the
defendants on the ground that there was no evidence of
either actual or constructive notice and, therefore, no
negligence. Id. at 405. We expressly applied the rule we
articulated in Schnuphase, requiring evidence of both
notice and sufficient time in which to remedy the dangerous condition. Id. at 407. As a result, we affirmed the
grant of summary judgment, reasoning that even if there
was evidence that the defendants had notice of the dangerous condition of the streetlights at some indeterminate
time before the accident, "there is no evidence indicating
how long UP&L had such notice. Without any [***19]
evidence to that effect, Fishbaugh cannot prove that the
City and UP&L failed to repair the streetlights within a
reasonable time after receiving notice and that they were
thus negligent in maintaining the streetlights." Id. at 408
(emphasis added).
[*P21] As in Fishbaugh, the proximate cause of
Mr. Goebel's injury was the breakdown or mechanical
degradation of something that was not alleged to have
been negligently created or installed. As in Fishbaugh,
therefore, this case falls into the category of negligence
cases requiring evidence that the defendant had some
kind of notice of the dangerous condition, together with
evidence that the defendant had that notice for a time
sufficient for it to repair the condition. In Fishbaugh,
there was evidence that the defendants may have indeed
had notice, but evidence was lacking regarding the length
of time that they had such notice. Id. In the instant case,
however, there is no evidence of notice, let alone evidence of how long Southern may have had that notice.
(*P22] [HN11] If a plaintiff alleges that a defendant negligently failed to remedy a dangerous condition
that the defendant did not create (as [***20] in
Schnuphase), negligently failed to repair a dangerous
malfunction in an otherwise safe system (as in
Fishbaugh), or negligently allowed an otherwise safe
condition to degrade over time into a dangerous
[**1194] condition (as in the instant case), then evidence of notice and a reasonable time to remedy are required to survive a motion for summary judgment or
directed verdict. These requirements do not apply where
the negligence claim requires the plaintiff to establish
that the defendant actually created the dangerous condition or purposefully built the dangerous condition into
the system for which the defendant is responsible. The
rationale behind these distinct rules is that it is reason-

able to presume that a party has notice of conditions that
the party itself creates, but it is not reasonable to presume
notice of conditions that someone else creates (as in
Schnuphase), that arise from malfunctions (as in
Fishbaugh), or that gradually evolve on their own.
[*P23] The Goebels tried to establish constructive
notice by arguing that Southern only lacked actual notice
of the gap because it failed to perform reasonable inspections of the crossing. The evidence at trial showed,
[***21] however, not only that the crossing was regularly inspected, but also that Mr. Goebel and Mr.
Goebel's bicycling expert, Charles Collins, both of whom
had used the crossing numerous times before the accident and should thus have been highly attuned to potential bicycle safety issues in the crossing, failed to notice
the gap. In that regard, this case is comparable to Maloney v. Salt Lake City, I Utah 2d 72, 262 P.2d 281
(Utah 1953). In Maloney, the plaintiff alleged that Salt
Lake City had negligently maintained a sidewalk that
collapsed while he was on it. Id. at 282. We affirmed a
directed verdict in favor of the city, emphasizing that the
plaintiff was unable to show that the sidewalk was in a
defective condition before the collapse, even though the
plaintiff himself had used the sidewalk many times prior
to the accident. Id. In this case, the Goebels failed as a
matter of law to establish constructive notice because
reasonable minds could not differ regarding whether
Southern should have noticed the gap. The trial court
therefore rightly found that no reasonable jury could
have found that Southern had constructive notice based
on the failure to reasonably [***22J inspect.
D. Whether the Length of Time the Gap Could Have
Existed Created Constructive Notice
[*P24] The Goebels also argue that the gap must
have evolved gradually over time, and that Southern
would therefore have noticed it if Southern had been
paying proper attention. Therefore, the Goebels assert,
the jury could have found that Southern should have
known it existed long enough to have a reasonable time
in which to repair it. The Goebels cite no case law to
support this proposition, aside from one case that states
generally that jurors can "make justifiable inferences
from circumstantial evidence to find negligence." Lindsay v. Gibbons & Reed, 27 Utah 2d 419, 497 P.2d 28, 31
(Utah 1972).
[*P25] First, contrary to the Goebels' assertions,
the evidence presented did not incontrovertibly prove
that the gap must have evolved gradually over time. In
fact, there was evidence that the gap may have formed
suddenly by being scraped or struck by, for example, a
snow plow. More importantly, however, even if the gap
had existed for a very long time, there is no reason to
believe that Southern should have noticed it. As we have
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already explained, there was no [***23J evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that Southern
Failed to reasonably inspect the crossing. See supra Part
.C. Moreover, even if Southern had notice of the gap for
ome time prior to the accident, the Goebels have offered
bsolutely no evidence from which a jury could infer the
?ngth of time that Southern had such notice. Therefore,
ot only would the jury have to speculate about whether
outhern had notice of the dangerous gap in the first
lace, it would also have to speculate about whether
Duthern had that notice far enough in advance to repair
e gap before Mr. Goebel's accident. Given our explicit
ling in Fishbaugh that a plaintiff in this kind of case
jst present evidence of the length of time that the deldant had notice, the Goebels' mere hypothesis that the
3 may have existed for some unknown length of time
ss not suffice.
E. Whether Notice Is Required Under the Goebels'
)lic Nuisance Claim
[*P26] The Goebels' final argument for why the
court erred in granting [**1195] Southern's motion
a directed verdict is that proof of notice was not reed for their public nuisance claim, which was based
Jtah Code section 76-10-803. The [***24] version
xtion 76-10-803 in effect in 1998, when the accident
rred, read in pertinent part as follows:

1

[HN12] (1) A public nuisance is a crime
against the order and economy of the state
and consists in unlawfully doing any act
or omitting to perform any duty, which
act or omission*

(a) annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of
three or more persons;

(c) unlawfully interferes
with, obstructs, or tends to
obstruct, or renders dangerous for passage, any . . .
street or highway; [or]

(e) in any way renders
three or more persons insecure in life or the use of
property.

(2) An act which affects three or more
persons in any of the ways specified in
this section is still a nuisance regardless of
the extent [to which the] annoyance or
damage inflicted on individuals is unequal.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-803 (1995). In a lengthy and
detailed analysis of this statute, the court of appeals has
interpreted section 76-10-803 to mean that a plaintiff
"must demonstrate that defendant's conduct was unreasonable in order to recover." Erickson v. Sorensen, 877
P.2d 144, 147-49 (Utah Ct App. 1994) [***25] (interpreting the 1990 version of Utah Code section 76-10803). [HN13] "[A] private party seeking damages for the
creation of a public nuisance must. . . [either] show that
defendant's action constituted nuisance per se, [or] demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable in
order to impose liability." Id. at 148-49 (citing Branch
v. W. Petroleum, Inc., 657 R2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982);
Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 943 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990)). The Goebels did not attempt to assert negligence per se. Instead, they focused on proving that
Southern acted unreasonably. The Erickson court also
properly explained what constitutes "unreasonable" behavior: [HN14] "Conduct creating a nuisance which
harms the plaintiff is unreasonable only where it is intentional, negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous." Id. at 149.
The parties agree that Southern's act of allowing the gap
to exist was neither intentional, nor reckless, nor ultrahazardous. Consequently, in order to survive Southern's
motion for directed verdict on the public nuisance claim,
the Goebels had to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Southern's [***26] conduct
was negligent.
[*P27] The Goebels argue that because the court in
Erickson did not discuss whether notice is required to
prove unreasonableness, notice is not required. We disagree for two reasons. First, there is no reason to believe
that notice was at issue in Erickson. In Erickson, the
plaintiff bicyclist collided with a sign defendant had
placed on the side of the road a few hours previously. Id.
at 146. There is no reason to believe that notice would
have been an issue on appeal in Erickson because outside
of a few conceivable but highly improbable circumstances, a party will always have notice of its own actions. In contrast here, Mr. Goebel's accident was caused
by a gap that either grew on its own or was created by a
third party, such as a snow plow driver. Second, we believe that [HN15] failure to repair a defective condition
about which one neither knows nor reasonably should
know is neither negligent nor unreasonable. That is why
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notice is a requirement in negligence cases such as this
one See supra Part I C (discussing Schnuphase, 918
P 2d at 476, and Fishbaugh, 969 P 2d at 407)
[*P28] Thus, we find [***27] that the trial court
committed no error m granting Southern's motion for
directed verdict
II DISMISSAL OF THE GOEBELS' SECTION 561-11 NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
[*P29] The Goebels' second argument is that the
trial court erred in ruling that the [**1196] Goebels
could not pursue a claim against Southern based on Utah
Code section 56-1-11 because such a claim would be
superfluous to the Goebels' common law negligence
claim [HN16] We review a trial court's decision to dismiss a claim for correctness, givmg no deference to its
legal conclusions on the issue Rushton v Salt Lake
County, 1999 UT36, PI 7, 977 P 2d 1201
[*P30] [HN17] Section 56-1-11 of the Utah Code
provides, "Every railroad company shall be liable for
damages caused by its neglect to make and maintain
good and sufficient crossings at points where any lme of
travel crosses its road" Utah Code Ann § 56-1-11
(2000) The Goebels assert that section 56-1-1 Ts use of
the word "neglect" refers to a kind of wrongdoing different from "negligence," and that therefore a claim pursued
under section 56-1-11 does not require a showing that
Southern had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition [***28] If we found this argument convincing, it would mean that a claim under section 56-111 was not superfluous to the Goebels' common law negligence claim
[*P31] Although the Goebels cite case law m
which notice was not at issue, see Van Wagoner v Union Pac RR Co, 112 Utah 189, 186 P2d 293 (Utah
1947), and deduce therefrom that notice is not required,
they cite no affirmative pronouncements for this point
As explamed above in Part I B , notice is required for a
claim based on section 56-1-11 to survive The clear rule
from Allen, Schnuphase, and Fishbaugh is that notice is
required to prove negligence in the context of a case such
as this one We find no reason to believe that the legislature used the word "neglect" in section 56-1-11 as a sort
of code word for "negligence liability m the absence of
notice " If the legislature saw fit to uproot the thoroughly
entrenched notion of notice from the law of negligence m
cases like this, we believe it could and would do so more
explicitly and less ambiguously than by simply usmg the
word "neglect" The tnal court therefore was correct m
dismissing the Goebels' section 56-1-11 claim for negligence [***29J
III A DUTY BASED ON THE AGREEMENT

[*P32] The Goebels' third argument is that the tnal
court ereed m finding that the Agreement was clear and
unambiguous and did not create a duty of care running
from Southern to the Goebels Alternatively, the Goebels
argue, the Agreement is ambiguous on the question of
whether it creates the Goebels' desired duty of care and,
therefore, the Goebels should be permitted to introduce
extrinsic evidence on this point
[*P33] Even if we were to find that the Agreement
created a duty that ran from Southern to the Goebels, and
that the trial court therefore ened in ruling to the contrary, such an ereor would not warrant reversal This is
because we affirm the trial court's finding that Southern
had a duty to the Goebels pursuant to Utah Code sections
10-7-26(2), 10-7-29, and 56-1-11, and Salt Lake City
Code section 14 44 030 See supra Part I B The Goebels
expressly acknowledge this point, but ask us to address
the question for purposes of the new trial that the
Goebels request us to grant in this case Because we affirm, however, no new trial will be held, and it is therefore unnecessary for us to reach the question of whether
the [***30] Agreement gave nse to a duty running from
Southern to the Goebels [HN18] We generally do not
decide issues unnecessary to the outcome of the case, see
Provo City Corp v Thompson, 2004 UT 14, P22, 86
P 3d 735 (finding the court of appeals' discussion of an
issue to be merely advisory m nature where the court of
appeals' conclusion on the issue "lacked
any meaningful effect to the parties"), and we are disinclined to
issue advisory opinions, Miller v Weaver, 2003 UT 12,
P26,66P3d592
IV EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
[*P34J The Goebels' fourth argument is that the
tnal court erred m excludmg, on the basis of rule 403 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence, the empincal evidence of
their expert witness, David Ingebretsen Accordmg to
[**1197] the Goebels, the evidence would have lent
strength to Mr Ingebretsen's opinion, which was allowed
into evidence, that Mr Goebel's accident occuned when
his front wheel entered the gap Specifically, the evidence consisted of the results of a test that Mr Ingebretsen performed to confirm that Mr Goebel's tire could fit
mto a gap like the one at the subject crossing
[*P35] Even if we were to conclude that the
[***31] tnal court did e n m excluding the evidence, oui
decision on the issue would be of no consequence to thi<
litigation in light of our other holdmgs That is because
the implicit reason for the Goebels' appeal on this issue l
that the evidence should have been admitted because i
would have assisted the tner of fact in evaluating th
Goebels' case Because we affirm the tnal court's dec
sion to grant the directed verdict and remove the cas
from the jury's consideration, it is unnecessary for us i
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decide this issue nl See Thompson, 2004 UT 14 atP22,
Miller, 2003 UT12 at P26

nl [HN19] Any litigant seeking to overturn
the trial court's decision to exclude evidence on
the basis of rule 403 faces a heavy burden "We
review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude
evidence under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence under an abuse of discretion standard,
and will not overturn a lower court's determination of admissibility unless it is beyond the limits
of reasonabihty " Diversified Holdings, L C v
Turner, 2002 UT 129, P6, 63 P 3d 686 (internal
quotation omitted) Our review of the record and
the trial court's reasoning m this case strongly
suggests that the Goebels' arguments would not
have been able to shoulder this burden
**32]
V RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF NOTICE
CLAIM REQUIREMENTS
[*P36] The Goebels' fifth and final claim on appeal
lat the trial court erroneously granted Salt Lake City's
ion for summary judgment because the Goebels
plied with the notice of claim requirements in the
ernmental Immunity Act in effect on the date of Mr
bel's injury [HN20] We review for correctness quesregardmg the law applicable m a case, including the
of whether a given law can or should be applied
actively Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp v
State Tax Comm'n, 953 P 2d 435, 437 (Utah 1997),
n & Root Indus Serv v Indus Comm'n, 947 P2d
575 (Utah 1997)
*P37] [HN21] "The Immunity Act demands strict
liance with its requirements to allow suit against
lmental entities The notice of claim provision,
llarly, neither contemplates nor allows for anything
Wheeler v McPherson, 2002 UT 16, PI 3, 40 P 3d
AT Goebel's accident occurred on February 19,
it which time the Utah Code required the notice of
to be "directed and delivered to the responsible
mental entity accordmg to the [***33] require)f§ 63-30-12 or § 63-30-13 " Utah Code Ann §
l(3)(b)(n) (1997) (emphasis added) Section 63the other statutory provision pertinent to this isuired filing of the notice of claim with "the gov>ody of the political subdivision" withm one year
late on which the claim arose Id § 63-30-13
is added) Thus, the Goebels argue that they
and timely filed their notice of claim, because
d it with DeeDee Corradini, the mayor of Salt
y at the time of filing, and also with the "Salt

Lake City Council and All Members of the Salt Lake
City Council" withm one year of the accident
[*P38] The Goebels recognize that the notice requirement m effect on August 11, 1998, when they actually filed their notice, was different from that which was
m effect at the time of Mr Goebel's injury, due to a
statutory amendment effective May 4, 1998 The notice
provision m effect on August 11, 1998 required the notice of claim to be directed and delivered to "the city or
town recorder, when the claim is against an incorporated
city or town" Id § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(n)(A) (Supp
j***34j 2003) (emphasis added) They argue, however,
that the amended notice provision was inapplicable to
their claim because applying it to them would constitute
improper retroactive application of the law
[*P39] [HN22] A statute is not to be applied retroactively unless the statute expressly declares [**1198]
that it operates retroactively Id § 68-3-3 (2000),
Stephens v Henderson, 741 P 2d 952, 953-54 (Utah
1987) We agree with the Umted States Supreme Court
that as a general rule, "retroactivity is not favored m the
law" Bowen v Georgetown Umv Hosp, 488 US 204,
208, 102 L Ed 2d 493, 109 S Ct 468 (1988) This rule
applies only with respect to substantive laws, however,
statutes that do not "enlarge, eliminate, or destroy" substantive rights can be applied retroactively Moore v
Am Coal Co, 737 P 2d 989, 990 (Utah 1987) (internal
quotation omitted), quoted in Thomas v Color Country
Mgmt, 2004 UT 12, P30, 84 P 3d 1201 (Durham, C J,
concurring) Convenience, reasonableness, and justice
are factors we consider in decidmg whether a statute has
a merely remedial or procedural purpose Docutel Olivetti Corp v Dick Brady Sys, 731 P 2d 475, 478 (Utah
1986) [***35] (quotmg Boucofski v Jacobsen, 36 Utah
165, 104 P 117, 119-20 (Utah 1909)), see also Moore,
737 P 2d at 990 (statmg that convenience and reasonableness are factors to be considered)

[HN23] When analyzing whether applying a statute as amended "would have retroactive effects inconsistent with the usual
rule that legislation is deemed to be prospective," we should use "a common
sense, functional judgment about 'whether
the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its
enactment' This judgment should be informed and guided by 'familiar considerations of farr notice, reasonable reliance,
and settled expectations"'
Martin v
Hadix, 527 US 343, 357-58, 144 L Ed
2d 347, 119 S Ct 1998 (1999) (quoting
Landgraf v USI Film Prods, 511 US
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244, 270, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 114 S. Ct
1483 (1994)).

tiffs substantive rights. The trial court therefore properly
granted summary judgment to the City.
CONCLUSION

Thomas, 2004 UT 12 atP35 (Durham, C.J., concurring).
[HN24] Considering the strong presumptions against
retroactivity in the law, and the common sense, functional factors that we consider in deciding whether to
apply a law retroactively, we should err on the side of
finding a [***36] statute substantive if we have doubt
about the issue.
[*P40] We have no doubt that the change in the notice of claim provision at issue in this case is procedural
in nature, and therefore retroactively applicable. The
amendment did nothing to affect the Goebels' substantive
rights to bring suit against the City. It merely changed
the identity of the party receiving the notice of claim
from the City's "governing body" to the city recorder. It
would be difficult to conceive of a statutory change that
would do less to "enlarge, eliminate, or destroy" a plain-

[*P41J The trial court correctly granted Southern's
motion for directed verdict and correctly dismissed the
Goebels' negligence claim under section 56-1-11 of the
Utah Code. As it was unnecessary to our resolution of
the issues, we have not addressed whether Southern
owed the Goebels a duty of care pursuant to the Agreement or whether the trial court abused its discretion in
excluding evidence under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. Finally, the trial court correctly granted the
City's motion for summary [***37] judgment on the
grounds that the 1998 amendment to Utah Code section
63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii), which demands strict compliance, is
retroactively applicable.
[*P42] Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice
Durrant, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in
Chief Justice Durham's opinion.

